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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000520-CA
:

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from his conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) (pour-over provision).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court plainly err or was defendant's trial counsel ineffective:
(a) when the court, with counsel's approval, instructed the jury that "it is no defense
to the prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or other
consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous
weapon was used" {Addendum B: Jury Instruction 13-Q;
(b) when the court, in response to a jury question and at trial counsel's request,
prepared a supplemental instruction to Instruction 13-C that clarified the phrase, "it is no

defense to the prosecution," but did not define the terms "duel, mutual combat, or other
consensual altercation;" or
(c) when the court, without objection, did not provide the prepared supplemental
instruction to the jury because, before the supplemental instruction could be given, the jury
announced it had reached a verdict?1
As defendant concedes, he failed to preserve these issues (Br.Aplt. at 2). Appellate
review of the merits is precluded unless defendant now establishes that the trial court
committed obvious and prejudicial error, or that his trial counsel's performance was deficient
and prejudicial. State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 20, ^ 18 & 40-41; State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, mi 19 & 31, 12 P.3d 92. Accord State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205,1 26, 29 P.3d 25
(reaffirming requirement that unpreserved challenges to jury instructions are reviewed only
for "manifest error"), cert, granted, 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 2001). Whether counsel is ineffective
is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Visser, 2001 UT App 215, ^ 8, 31 P.3d 584,
cert, denied, - P.3d - (Utah 2001). Whether a jury instruction is erroneous is a question of
law. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, U 11, 6 P-3d 1116.
2. Did procedural delays in defendant's direct appeal or omissions in the appellate
record violate defendant's constitutional rights and result in actual prejudice justifying
reversal of his conviction and barring his retrial?

1

Defendant's Points I and II attack Instruction 13-C and the omission of a
supplemental instruction. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 1-3, 31-32. The State
combines its response in a single point.
2

Again, this issue is not preserved and no standard of review applies. Whether a
procedural delay or a record omission violate constitutional rights and result in actual
prejudice is a question of law, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the individual
case. Cf. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, HI 3-4 & n.3, 34 P.3d 790 (applying an
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a dismissal of an information for a speedy trial
violation, but recognizing the underlying issues of fact and law). See also Harris v.
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of an
inquiry into the reasons for appellate delay, even in jurisdictions where the length of the
delay gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the appellate process was ineffective).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
For ease of reference, the State cites to the current version of any statute or rule unless
the substance of the pertinent portion of the provision was amended since defendant's trial.
Resolution of the appeal involves the following provisions, reproduced in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (1999) - Force in defense of person;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 (1999) - Consensual altercation no defense

to

homicide or assault if dangerous weapon used;
R. CRIM. P. 17 - The Trial.

UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
(A) The Jury Trial
In 1992, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
2

The procedural history of defendant's case is determinative of his due process
claim; yet, defendant omits or mischaracterizes much of that history. See Br.Aplt. at 7523. Consequently, the State discusses the procedural facts in detail.
3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-203(a), (b), & (c) (1990), now UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(a),

(b), & (c) (Supp. 2001), subject to a firearm penalty enhancement (R. 2, 17-18).
J. Mac Arthur Wright, a Washington County Public Defender, was appointed to
represent defendant (R. 3). Subsequently, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine if
a conflict existed (R. 52-53). See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 859 (Utah 1992)
(recognizing a disqualifying conflict if a part-time prosecutor also serves as a public
defender). The court found that Mr. Wright had no actual conflict of interest since his only
association with the prosecuting firm was that he owned the building in which the firm was
located (id.). Defendant affirmatively waived any potential conflict and requested that Mr.
Wright continue as his attorney (id.).
Mr. Wright actively represented defendant at preliminary hearing, during pretrial
hearings, and at trial (R. 15-16, 21-22, 33, 41-46, 54-67, 68, 70-85, 112-13). A private
defense investigator was appointed and additional funds allocated for defense investigation,
including funds for out-of-state travel and ballistic testing (R. 26, 37-39, 41-46).
A jury trial occurred on December 15-18,1992 (R. 78-85). Mr. Wright called eleven
witnesses, including defendant, to support defendant's claim that he shot the victim in selfdefense (R. 93-95). Nevertheless, the jury convicted defendant of murder (R. 114).
During their deliberations, the jury requested "clarification" of Jury Instruction 13-C.
See Addenda B & C: Instructions & Jury Notes. The trial court, with counsel's approval,
told the jury they should "rely on the language of 13-C as it is written, and consider all the
instructions as a whole" (id.; R. 1328-29). Later, the jury sent a second note that asked if the
4

phrase "[i]t is no defense to the prosecution" in Instruction 13-C meant it is "no help for the
prosecution" (Addendum Q. Defense counsel "persuade[d] the Court that a clarifying and
supplemental instruction should be given to the jurors, to clarify in their minds the meaning
of that instruction" (R. 1363). See Addendum D: Order Supplementing Record. With the
assistance of counsel, the court prepared a written supplemental instruction (R. I l l , 1363).
But before the supplemental instruction could be given, the court and counsel were
"informed by the Court Clerk that the jury had a verdict" (R. 1363). The parties and the
judge then reassembled in the courtroom (R. 1329). The court asked if there was "anything
before the Court prior to [the jury's] return," and defense counsel responded, "Nothing, Your
Honor" (id.). The jury was returned to the courtroom and affirmed they had reached a
verdict (R. 1330). Counsel did not request further instruction of the jury before the verdict
was read (R. 1330, 1363-64). After the verdict was returned, the jurors were polled at
counsel's request (R. 1330). The court then asked if there was "[a]nything further to come
before the Court prior to the discharge of the jury;" defense counsel again responded,
"Nothing, Your Honor" (R. 1331-32, 1363-64).
After the jury was discharged, defendant asked to be sentenced immediately (R. 133335).3 The court sentenced defendant to prison for the statutory indeterminate term of six-

- During sentencing, defense counsel voiced a "concern" about "some of the
questions that the jury expressed to us. Questions that we were unable to respond to
before the - before the jury came back;" however, he did not object to the lack of
supplemental instruction or otherwise move to set aside the verdict or for a mistrial (R.
1329-33, 1336, 1362-64).
5

years-to-life (R. 125-28,1472,1477-86).4 The judgment was entered on January 6,1993 (R.
125-128). On January 22, 1993, Mr. Wright timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 134).
Defendant's First Appeal, No. 931357-CA5
Mr. Wright requested preparation of the trial record and transcripts (R. 1434). He
then withdrew, apparently because defendant wished to challenge Mr. Wright's
effectiveness, and arranged for Mark Miller's appointment as pew counsel (R. 264, 1434).
Mr. Miller entered his appearance on February 10, 1993, and subsequently filed a
docketing statement (R. 264). After reviewing the appellate record, Mr. Miller moved for
remand to the trial court to permit supplementation of the appellate record with the
unrecorded

discussions

concerning the supplemental

instruction

(R.

1442-44).

Contemporaneously, defendant moved pro se to remove Mr. Miller as his attorney and for
the appointment of new appellate counsel {Addendum F). On April 24, 1994, this Court
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the pro se request for new

4

The original judgment imposed an erroneous term for the firearm enhancement;
the judgment was subsequently amended to impose the correct six-year minimum term
(R. 125-28, 1472, 1477-86).
5

The record on appeal contains a pro se motion, together with attachments of
documents that are not otherwise included in the appellate record (R. 1409-52).
Defendant has attached the same documents to his appellate brief. See Br.Aplt.,
Defendant's Addendum. The State references some of these documents as necessary to
explain the procedural history. See, e.g., Addendum E: Fifth District Court Docket Sheet,
No. 921500702. Additionally, the State relies on this Court's docket sheet in defendant's
original direct appeal. See Addendum F: Docket Sheet, No. 931357-CA. Pursuant to rule
201, Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court may take judicial notice of its own records and
prior proceedings in the same case. Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989).
The State requests the Court do so.
6

counsel, and to permit creation of a supplemental record as requested by Mr. Miller (R.
1437). Mr. Miller withdrew on May 12, 1994; he died approximately three weeks later (R.
1438, 1440).
On June 15,1994, the district court appointed Floyd Holm to represent defendant (R.
1449). Mr. Holm completed the supplementation of the record (R. 1362-64). He also
moved for remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which motion
was denied (Addendum F). Mr. Holm was ordered to file defendant's brief by October 25,
1995 (R. 1365). On October 19,1995, one week before the brief was due, defendant moved
pro se for Mr. Holm's removal, despite Mr. Holm's warning to defendant that requesting new
counsel would delay the appeal (R. 1387). The Court denied the pro se motion and ordered
Mr. Holm to file the brief no later than January 10,1996 (Addendum F). On January 5,1996,
five days before the brief was due, defendant again moved pro se to remove Mr. Holm (R.
1373).6 This time, the Court remanded to the district court for consideration of the pro se
motion (R. 1371). The district court removed Mr. Holm and appointed Thomas A. Blakely
to represent defendant (R. 1394-96).

6

Defendant complained the county attorney handpicked Mr. Holm (R. 1422-25).
The county attorney simply contracted with the Iron County public defender because
defendant had exhausted the list of Washington County public defenders (Addendum E).
Defendant also filed a bar complaint against Mr. Holm (R. 1366-68). Because the
complaint was pending, Mr. Holm initially agreed a conflict existed (R. 1377-78). Once
the complaint was resolved (Mr. Holm was directed to maintain better contact with
defendant), the attorney felt he could continue as defendant's counsel (R. 1393).
Defendant disagreed: he appealed the Bar's decision and insisted that Mr. Holm be
removed (R. 1393).
7

On February 23, 1996, Mr. Blakeiy entered his appearance (Addendum F). Briefing
was reset to June 7, 1996. Id. When no brief was filed, this Court dismissed the appeal on
June 26, 1996 (R. 1399). Remittitur issued on August 12, 1996 (R. 1401).
From August 12, 1996, to June 5, 2000, no appeal was pending in this case.
Defendant's Post-Conviction Petitions
Though Mr. Blakely's representation had terminated a year before, defendant filed
a pro se motion on September 2, 1997, entitled "Motion to Withdraw Court Appointed
Counsel, Thomas A. Blakeiy" (R. 1409-33). The pro se motion asked the district court to
resentence defendant nunc pro tunc so he could appeal his conviction (id.). See State v.
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). He complained that his prior appointed counsel were
conflicted (R. 1411-13, 1420, 1426-28).7 He also alleged that Mr. Miller had failed to
supplement the record and that significant portions of the record were missing (R. 1415,
1421 -22).8 Despite defendant's frivolous allegations, he asserted one meritorious claim: Mr.

7

No conflicts existed. The trial court determined, at the time of Mr. Wright's
appointment, that he had no disqualifying conflict (R. 52-53). Nor does the record
support defendant's claim that Mr. Blakeiy "defrauded" him by allegedly accepting
SI5.00 as a private retainer (R. 1426-27). There is no evidence that Mr. Blakeiy ever
agreed to privately represent defendant or that defendant protested Mr. Blakeiy's
appointment in 1996.
8

Mr. Holm supplemented the record (R. 1362-65). Nevertheless, defendant
continues to claim the record is missing significant documents (Br.Aplt. at 16-17, 25, 47).
The claim is without merit. In 1994, the district court entered an order supplementing the
record (R. 1362-64). A court clerk later discovered that the 1994 order and 14 pages of
miscellaneous documents were missing. The 1994 order has since been replaced through
stipulation of counsel (Addendum D). The remaining missing documents are not
determinative of the issues on appeal. See Order, No. 2000520-CA, dated 6/22/01.
8

Blakelv had failed to file an appellate brief, which failure resulted in the dismissal of
defendant's appeal in Case No. 931357-CA (R. 1428-29).
Defendant raised the same claim in a contemporaneous but separate civil postconviction petition (Addendum E). Odean Bowler, a Washington County public defender,
was appointed to represent defendant in both proceedings (id.). On August 17, 1999,
following an evidentiary hearing in the civil case, the district court granted defendant's postconviction petition and ordered defendant re-sentenced nunc pro tunc in the criminal case
(R. 1459-62, 1472). On May 8, 2000, a nunc pro tunc judgment was entered that permitted
Mr. Bowler to file a new notice of appeal on June 5, 2000 (R. 1482-86, 1488).
Defendant's Current Appeal, No. 20000520-CA
Mr. Bowler filed a docketing statement but then moved to withdraw since he was no
longer the Washington County Public Defender (R. 1494). On October 26,2000, this Court
remanded the case to the district court for appointment of new counsel (R. 1494).
Defendant's current appellate counsel was appointed on January 17, 2001 (R. 1498). On
November 28, 2001, appellant's brief was filed.

9

STATEMENT OF FACTS9
It was 5:00 a.m., but defendant did not care: Larry Gilstrap, a neighbor in defendant's
trailer park, was "fucking around with [defendant's] home boy's old lady" and defendant
wanted to "talk" to him (R. 1182; see also R. 444-45, 530-31, 749, 855). Defendant sat in
his living room with a loaded .22 pistol pointed at his head and told his friend Donald
Turnbow to bring Larry to defendant's trailer or defendant would kill himself (R. 441-42,
750-53, 755). When the pistol's ammunition clip fall out, Tumbow grabbed it (R. 756).
Defendant boasted, "That ain't the only the gun I have," and reached for a nearby Thompson
machine gun (R. 441-42,756). Defendant put the machine gun between his legs and pointed
its barrel at his face (R.441 -42,757). With his thumb on the trigger, defendant told Tumbow
to give him back the .22 clip or he would shoot (R. 757). Tumbow gave back the clip (R.
758). Defendant still wanted someone to bring Larry to him (id.).
Defendant's wife went to Larry's trailer (R. 856). Larry and another mutual friend,
John Gourley, were there (R. 737, 840, 856). She told them defendant was "getting crazy,
holding a gun to his head and stuff like that" (R. 856). Gourley cautioned Larry that if he
went to defendant's, he better leave his gun in his truck because "everyone [was] pretty

9

Defendant does not directly challenge the evidence, but claims the jury
instructions and appellate delays prejudiced him. See Br.Aplt. at 29-30, 44-45, 47.
Resolution of these issues is necessarily fact-dependent; yet, defendant fails to marshal
the evidence, impermissibly relying on his version of the facts. See Br.Aplt. at 4-15. See
also State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 17 & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. Consequently, the State
restates the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Litherland, 2000
UT 76, H 2.
10

drunk" (R.856).10
Meanwhile, the violence at defendant's trailer escalated. Defendant retrieved a .357
revolver from a cabinet and loaded it (R. 759). Defendant fired the .357 through his living
room wall into his daughter's bedroom, shattering a picture hanging over her bed (R. 439-41,
709-11, 760, 766, 952-54, 1172-73). Gourley was still at Larry's, but when he heard the
shot, he ran back to defendant's trailer (R. 856-57).
Larry drove up minutes later in his truck (R. 642, 661, 920). He was alone (R. 635,
649-50, 655, 714). Despite defendant's earlier insistence that he just wanted to talk to
Larry, defendant began muttering, "Somebody get the motherfucker out of here before I kill
him" (R. 773). Defendant armed with his .357 and .22 walked up to Larry, who was
standing outside his truck (R. 715-16, 773, 857-58, 923, 1181). The two moved about 15
feet away from the truck (R. 426, 859-60, 924). Tumbow and Gourley could not see them
in the darkness, but they could partially hear them (R. 659-61, 768-74, 923-29). So could
several neighbors (R. 468-71,486,495-96, 501-05, 507,633-40,645-46,653-56, 661, 667,
672-74).
Defendant angrily told Larry to leave his friend's girlfriend alone (R. 861, 1182).

10

Gourley warned Larry because Gourley, like others, knew that Larry often
carried a .22 (R. 803-05, 856). Gourley also knew that defendant was drunk and
belligerent because he had been in a fistfight with him a few hours earlier and defendant
had threatened to "blow [Gourley's] head off (R. 554-55, 742-44, 842-43, 845, 116769). Larry knew about the prior threat, but also knew that defendant and Gourley had
"hugged" and made up (R. 846, 849, 853, 919).

11

Larry replied, "Hey, man. It doesn't have to be this way. Come on, man" (R. 772, 862).
Defendant fired in rapid succession, hitting Larry in the neck, chest, and back (R. 717, 771,
862-64,874,902-05,911,1185-86,1225). Larry lay in the dirt, breathing heavily, his lungs
audibly gurgling as they filled with blood (R. 655-56, 870). Defendant said, "Fuck. That
wall show him" and "Somebody come and get this dumb son of a bitch" (R. 636, 655-56,
668, 866-67).
Defendant told Gourley to help him drag Larry to the truck or defendant would "shoot
[his] ass too" (R. 871, 1186). Defendant's son also helped (R. 721-22, 1188). Someone
wiped fingerprints off Larry's gun and placed it on the ground next to a large pool of blood
where Larry had been shot (R. 972-74).n Gourley shouted out to the neighbors, "He's been
shot. Call an ambulance" (R. 496, 774). Defendant and his son just walked away (R. 646,
675). As they did, a neighbor heard defendant say, "It was a good place for an ambush" (R.
675-76, 679).
Defendant had Larry's blood on his clothes (R. 965-66). Instead of going to his own
trailer just a few feet away, he went to the trailer-home of Rita Gilstrap's, Larry's estranged
wife (R. 687, 722, 1189). He told her he "had just shot Larry, and that he was dead. That
11

Larry had a .22 in the truck when he went to defendant's, but only defendant
claimed Larry had it outside the truck (R. 431, 437, 537, 884-86, 1185, 1204). The
forensic evidence established that Larry's gun had been wiped clean of prints and placed
on top of a pool of Larry's blood after he was shot (R. 972-74). The prosecutor argued
that after the killing, defendant found the gun in its holster inside the truck and placed it
near the pool of blood after wiping it clean of prints (R. 1276-77). Defendant admitted
that he rummaged in the truck, but claimed he was only looking for the truck's keys (R.
1187).
12

Larry had pulled a gun on him, and he'd shot him" (R. 688, 694). Defendant changed his
clothes, hiding his bloody clothes between the mattresses of Rita's bed (R. 689,723,948-49,
1190). Defendant still had both his guns. He told her that he had used the .357 to kill Larry
and if she "talked to the police [she] would be next" (R. 691-92). As he left, defendant hid
the .22 under Rita's front steps and the .357 under her garbage can (R. 442-43, 690, 119092).
Defendant then went to Tamara Howard's trailer (R. 480). He told her Larry was
dead (R. 483). Tamara asked if defendant killed him (R. 484). Defendant responded, "Do
you see any blood on me?" (id.). Tamara said no and defendant replied, "Well, then" (id.).
Within 10 minutes of the shooting, the police arrived and discovered Larry's body in
the truck (R. 402-06,520). Initially, the police thought Turnbow, who had had a run-in with
Larry two weeks earlier, might be involved (R. 417, 523).12 After defendant changed his
clothes and hid his guns, he casually walked back towards his trailer where the police were
securing the scene (R. 407-08, 523). Defendant told them Turnbow was not involved, but
gave no other information about the shooting (R. 408-09, 524, 725, 1193-94).
A few minutes later, the police spoke to Turnbow and shifted their focus to defendant
(R. 417-18). The police eventually found defendant hiding inside Tamara Howard's trailer
and arrested him (R. 419-23, 488).
12

Days before, Larry and Turnbow had an argument during which Larry put his
hand on his holstered gun (R. 819-20). Turnbow told Larry that if he "pull[ed] out the
gun, [Turnbow] would knock [him] out" (R. 820). Larry did not pull out the gun (R. 829,
831). Nevertheless, Turnbow reported the incident to the police (R. 821).
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During his first police interview, defendant denied firing any weapon at Larry (R.
533). He claimed that Larry and "a bunch of [unidentified] guys" had come to his trailer to
"take care of business" (R. 530-31, 538). Defendant tried to speak to Larry about his
"messing" with defendant's friend's girlfriend, but "the son of a bitch pulled a fucking gun
on me and had four fucking people out there.... The motherfucker pulled a gun on me, and
I wrestled with . . . As a matter of fact, I punched him, and that's exactly what 1 done. I
punched that motherfucker, and he was going for his fucking gun, and that's - and that was
that." (R. 585). Defendant never got "a chance to pull his gun out" (R. 537). He did not
know who shot Larry, only that it was not him (R. 538). Defendant admitted he owned a .45
revolver, but denied owning a .22 or .357 weapon (R. 538-40).
A second police interview, the same day, was taped (R. 556). Confronted with his
son's statement that defendant hid the .22 at Rita's, defendant admitted he placed the .22
under her steps, but still denied it was his (R. 560-62). He then admitted that he had the .22
with him when he confronted Larry, but claimed he "did not get a chance to even pull that
gun out" (R. 564-65). Contrary to his first statement, he now admitted that a gun had been
fired inside his house just prior to Larry's arrival, but denied he fired it and denied any
knowledge of the bullet hole in his daughter's bedroom wall (R. 558-60).
In describing the confrontation, he still claimed Larry hit him in the head with what
he assumed to be a gun, but now admitted that he had "smacked" or "punched" Larry first
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(R.565, 556-57).I3 According to defendant, "The next thing I know we are on the ground,
and there was shooting going on. I don't know if he was shooting or I'm shooting or who
was shooting, you know. And the rest of you guys out there, they - they were gone, and that
was that" (R. 556-67). He insisted that if he did fire a gun, he did not know what gun he
used, and suggested that Larry's unidentified friends may have accidently shot Larry while
trying to shoot defendant (R. 564).14 Defendant was emphatic that Larry was still alive when
defendant dragged him to the truck (R. 1186, 1226). He insisted that his intent in placing
Larry in the truck was to take him to the hospital, but claimed he first needed to change his
bloody clothes so that the police would not think he had shot Larry (R. 1186-88, 1227-29).
The day after the murder, defendant was interviewed a third time; the interview was
again taped (R. 549,552). The .357 had been recovered (R. 442-43,453).l5 Confronted with
the discovery, defendant admitted that he fired the .357 inside his home and "thought" he
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Defendant assumed it was a gun because Larry usually carried one: "All I seen
was a black thing in his hand. I knew goddamn well it wasn't no water pistol, you know.
I seen something black, and it was a gun. At least I thought it was a gun. All I seen was
black, and that's all I know. And I ain't never seen Larry's gun at all" (R. 618).
14

Other witnesses, including defendant's son, testified that Larry was alone
(R.635, 649-50, 655, 714, 824).
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When defendant's .357 was discovered, it had "one empty round, four spent
cartridges and one cartridge that was still loaded with the primer indented," indicating
that the gun may have misfired (R. 964-65). This was consistent with the description of
the majority of the witnesses, who described hearing one shot (the shot inside the house)
and then minutes later three shots in rapid succession (R. 468-70, 494-96, 501, 509-10,
635, 638, 653-55,672-74, 717, 760, 771). Gourley testified that defendant may also have
fired into the air before Larry arrived (R. 859, 862, 864, 874, 093-912; see also 1180-81).
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might have fired it at Larry:
[Interviewer]: Now, you did fire that .357 in your house; is that right?
[Defendant]: Right. I did.
Q:Why?
A: Because I was thinking about shooting myself. You know, I'm not here to
hurt nobody, you know. And I don't want to put my family - and I don't want
to put my kids through no shit. Now, I already knew Larry pulled a gun on
somebody,116] and I was going to - and I wasn't going out there without
packing, okay? And when he went for the fucking gun, I smacked him. I got
hit in the head, and I pulled my gun out, and I shot him.
Q: Okay. Larry pulled his gun; you pulled yours and shot? Okay, yesterday,
you didn't know. You grabbed his gun, shot him with it, or someone else shot
him. So you're telling us A: Right.
Q: You're telling us that you pulled your gun and physically shot him?
A: I think I shot him. I don't know. I was drunk.ll7]
Q: Okay. You just said that you shot him, but you just don't know how many
times?
A: Right. I said I shot him, and I was drunk, and I had to have shot him
anyways.
Q: But you don't remember how many times you pulled the trigger.
A: No, I don't.
A: We were wrestling when - when I think he got shot.[18]
Q: The question is what exactly did Larry do with the gun that you remember
after he pulled it out?
A: He pulled it out, and I smacked him.
Q: Okay. Then what did he do with the gun?
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The reference was to the Turnbow incident, see note 12, supra.
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Defendant drank all night (R. 444-45, 556, 726). At trial, he maintained he
could remember everything that occurred, but that his inebriation lead him to lie to the
police (R. 1200-01, 1219, 1224-25, 1242). He did not claim his intoxication negated his
intent, only that he acted in self-defense. Nevertheless, a voluntary intoxication
instruction was given (R. 105).
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Two witnesses thought they heard pushing or kicking during the argument, but
the police found no evidence of a struggle (R. 463-64, 637-38, 654, 659).
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A: He didn't get to do very much with the gun, because we was rolling around
on the ground, and I pulled mine out, and I used mine first.
Q: So he never did point it at you or anything, then?
A: He tried pointing it at me as we were wrestling. And I rolled, and he did
not shoot at me, but he did point it at me. And that's when I shot him with
mine.
Q: Where did he point it at you? What part of you?
A: He pointed it I was guessing the chest, and that's when I rolled.
(R. 566-69).
By trial, defendant suggested that John Gourley accidently shot Larry (R. 1043,
1047). Defendant claimed that Gourley or some other unidentified friend of Larry's fired
the first shot, intending to hit defendant, but accidently hitting Larry (R. 1185, 1233).
Defendant claimed he then fired two shots at Larry in self-defense while the two wrestled
on the ground (R. 1186-1225, 1236). No evidence established that Gourley was armed or
had fired the first shot (R. 917, 936-37, 1119-21, 1128). Indeed, the defense witness, who
originally claimed Gourley confessed to him, admitted at trial that he made up the story to
try to help defendant (R. 1105-08, 1112-15).
The forensic evidence also undermined defendant's claim that the first shot was fired
by someone else as defendant and Larry wrestled on the ground. The first gun shot was fired
at close range, only 12-18 inches from Larry's neck (R. 1004, 1017, 1025). At the time,
Larry's left arm was raised in a defensive posture (R. 1000). The bullet entered Larry's neck
from the left front, followed a lateral path, and exited on the right side just above the
collarbone (R. 998, 1005-06). It created a large hole in Larry's larynx, damaging his vocal
cords and causing air to audibly escape as he tried to breath (R. 1002). While the wound was
17

fatal, death did not occur immediately; Larry was conscious for one to five more minutes (R.
1003,1025, 1032-33). The recovered bullet fragment was not sufficient to conduct ballistic
testing, but appeared to be consistent with a .357 (R. 436, 985, 986-87).
According to witnesses, the second and third shots rapidly followed the first. See
supra at 11-12. The second shot was fired from an indeterminate range, that is, not point
blank range, while Larry's left arm was close to his chest (R.1007, 1009, 1017). It entered
his left arm, above the elbow, and then entered his left chest just below the nipple (R. 100708). The bullet fractured Larry's seventh rib, traveled through both lobes of the left lung,
and lodged in Larry's backbone, where it was recovered and eventually matched to
defendant's .357 (R. 979-82, 1008). The wound caused blood to enter Larry's chest,
collapsing his left lung, and restricting the flow of blood to his heart (R. 1011).
The third shot occurred after Larry fell to the ground and rolled over: Larry was
probably lying flat on his stomach with his assailant standing over him and firing down (R.
1016-17, \§12\ see also K. 862-63,905-06). The bullet entered Larry's lower back, traveled
into his abdominal cavity, struck his left kidney, entered his abdomen, struck his spleen,
perforated his diaphragm, entered his chest cavity, went through his left lower lung, exited
his upper left lung lobe, deflected off his sixth rib, and reentered Larry's left upper lung lobe,
where it was recovered and subsequently matched to defendant's .357 (R. 982-85, 1012).
After this shot, death occurred quickly (R. 1014-15, 1032-33).
The jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense and convicted him of murder (R.
114).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Jury Instructions: Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred and his trial
counsel was ineffective (a) in instructing the jury on consensual altercation in Jury
Instruction 13-C, (b) in not defining "duel, mutual combat, and consensual altercation" in a
supplemental instruction to Instruction 13-C, and (c) in permitting the jury's verdict to be
returned without giving a supplemental instruction. Defendant's arguments lack merit.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-104 (1999) limits a defendant's reliance on self-defense

when a dangerous weapon is used during a consensual altercation which results in homicide.
Here, defendant admitted that the encounter with the victim was consensual, that a firearm
was used, and the victim died as a result. Instruction 13-C, which copied the statute verbatim
was, therefore, proper.
During deliberations, the jury twice requested clarification of Instruction 13-C. The
first time, the court properly elected not to provide additional instruction to the jury. The
second time, the court elected to provide a supplemental instruction.

The ensuing

supplemental instruction properly responded only to the question asked. It did not define
"duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation" because no issue was raised concerning
those common terms. Before the supplemental instruction could be given, however, the jury
announced it had reached a verdict. The jury's announcement effectively negated their prior
request for clarification of Instruction 13-C. Under these circumstances, no error occurred
in accepting the verdict without providing a response to the jury's prior inquiry.
Even if this Court found error in Instruction 13-C or in the return of the jury verdict,
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any error would be harmless. Instruction 13-C, though correct, was incomplete. As written,
Instruction 13-C overstated the available legal defenses. If the jury had been fully instructed
on Utah law, they would have been informed that once a defendant uses a firearm in mutual
combat, the defendant is precluded from claiming self-defense unless he "effectively
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent
to do so and the other person notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use of
unlawful force." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(c) (1999). No version of the facts
would support such a finding. Consequently, defendant suffered no prejudice from the
instructions as given or from any lack of clarification prior to the verdict's return.
Delay in Appeal and Omissions in Record: Defendant claims he has a Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy appeal, which was violated in this case. He also asserts that
delays in his appeal and omissions in the record violate his right to due process. Defendant's
argument is without merit. A criminal appeal must comport with due process, but neither the
United States Supreme or Utah appellate courts recognize a Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy appeal.
Here, every effort was made to accommodate defendant's repetitive demands for new
counsel.

One counsel was ineffective and caused defendant's original appeal to be

dismissed. That error was cured when defendant was resentenced nunc pro tunc and his right
to appeal reinstated. Likewise, an order was missing from the record on appeal, but has since
been replaced; no other significant documents are missing. In sum, delay since defendant's
conviction has been substantial, but his appellate process has been constitutional.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
CLARIFICATION OF JURY INSTRUCTION 13-C WAS NOT
MANDATED; THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO LEGAL
REQUIREMENT TO GIVE A SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION
BEFORE THE JURY RETURNED THEIR VERDICT
The jury was instructed pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 (1999), that:
[i]t is no defense to the prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel,
mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel,
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon was used. A firearm is a
dangerous weapon.
(R. 104; Instruction 13-C). See Addenda A & B: Statutes & Court's Instructions. On appeal,
defendant challenges Instruction 13-C, claiming that a mutual combat/consensual altercation
instruction should not have been given because "it could deprive one of the protection of
self-defense" (Br.Aplt. at 28). Defendant also argues that Instruction 13-C was "confusing"
because the terms "duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" were not defined
(Br.Aplt. at 26-30). Because an instruction defining those terms was not given before the
verdict was returned, defendant claims he was prejudiced and his conviction should be
reversed (Br.Aplt. at 31-32). Defendant raises these unpreserved issues for the first time on
appeal under the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to the
preservation requirement (Br.Aplt. at 1-3).,9 See State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 20,ffljl8 & 40-41;
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1 8, 12 P.3d 92 (both affirming plain error and ineffective
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Point I of the State's brief responds to Points I and II of defendant's brief.
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counsel as exceptions to the preservation rule). See also State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205,
]j 26, 29 P.3d 25 (reaffirming that unpreserved challenges to jury instructions will only be
reviewed for "manifest error"), cert, granted, 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 2001).
Defendant's arguments maybe summarily rejected for lack of proper briefing. If their
substance is considered, the arguments are without merit.
(A) Defendant's Claims Are Not Adequately Briefed Nor the Evidence
Properly Marshaled.
This Court need not consider defendant's challenges to Instruction 13-C and to the
return of the jury verdict because defendant has not complied with the briefing requirements
of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and has not marshaled the evidence to support
his claim of prejudice. See State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) ("[a]
well-briefed argument is most essential for an issue raised by an appellee for the first time
on appeal because the new issue has not been addressed by the parties below and thus record
support for the unaddressed argument is critical"). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that an appellate court is "not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research").
In Point I of his brief, defendant cites authority for the axiom that reversible error may
occur if a jury is not properly instructed. See BrAplt. at 28-30. At the same time, he
concedes that the challenged jury instruction, Instruction 13-C, tracks verbatim the language
of section 76-5-104. See BrAplt. at 28. Nevertheless, defendant muses: "One could
wonder, is 76-5-104 unconstitutional?" (id.). Defendant does not further develop this
22

argument and does not otherwise present authority that Instruction 13-C is erroneous.
Without such authority, his plain error and ineffective counsel arguments fail. See Pecht,
2002 UT 20, HI 18 & 40-41; Litherland, 2000 UT 76,ffi[19 & 31 (affirming that plain error
and ineffective assistance of counsel require an initial establishment of error). See also
Casey, 2001 UT App 205,126 ("manifest error" requires establishment of substantial error).
Defendant also impermissibly relies on New York law, while failing to acknowledge
controlling Utah law. See Br.Aplt. at 26-27. Defendant fails to cite to rule 17(m), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which controls a criminal trial court's response to a jury
inquiry. See Addendum A: Rule. See also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah
1985); State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459,460 (Utah 1984); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,3-4 (Utah
App. 1993) (all recognizing applicability of rule 17(m) to criminal trials). And defendant
fails to acknowledge Utah precedent addressing the appropriateness of mutual combat
instructions in self-defense cases. See State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90-91 (Utah 1981)
(recognizing appropriateness of a similarly worded mutual combat/consensual altercation
instruction in a manslaughter prosecution where the defendant claimed he only armed
himself in self-defense); State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977) (recognizing
section 76-5-104's limitation on a defendant's claim of self-defense in a homicide
prosecution); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560-61 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing
appropriateness of a similarly worded mutual combat/consensual altercation instruction in
a homicide prosecution where the defendant claimed she acted in self-defense in response
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to the victim's initial aggressiveness), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v.
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555-56 (Utah App. 1991) (upholding use of identically worded
mutual combat/consensual altercation instruction in a homicide prosecution involving almost
identical facts to those currently on appeal). Defendant's failure to acknowledge this
precedent is especially glaring because the trial court cited Sherard during the jury
instruction conference (R. 1260-61 & 1263). Defendant's failure to properly cite controlling
authorities allows this Court to summarily reject his arguments. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford
Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 1 13, 15 P.3d 1030 (recognizing party's duty to cite
controlling case law adverse to its position).
In Point II of his brief, defendant's lack of developed argument is flagrant. Presenting
a variation of his first argument, defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to Instruction 13-C, in not seeking a supplemental instruction defining the
consensual altercation, and in not moving for a mistrial when the jury verdict was returned
without a response to the jury's prior request for clarification. See Br.Aplt. 31-32. Without
further factual or legal argument, he then simply references his argument in Point I. See id.
Moreover, defendant's claims are dependent upon a showing of prejudice. SeePecht,
2002 UT 20,11 18 & 40-41; Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 19 & 31; Casey, 2001 UT App
205,126. Yet, defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and fails to
establish that, but for the alleged errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different.
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 17 & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (setting forth marshaling standard
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and requirement). Instead, defendant simply speculates that he suffered prejudice because
the jury may have been confused. See Br.Aplt. at 27-28& 30 & 32. To the degree defendant
recites the evidence (Br.Aplt. at 4-15), he does nothing more than restate his own version of
the evidence, a version rejected by the jury (e.g., Br.Aplt. at 9-10 ("according to Frausto "),
at 11 ("Frausto reveals"), at 12 ("Frausto denies"), at 12-13 ("Frausto believes"). See
Gamblin, id. (recognizing impermissibility of simply rearguing facts rejected by the factfinder). Defendant's failures justify summary rejection of his challenges. See id.; Bishop,
753 P.2d at 450. Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, defendant's challenges are
meritless.
(B) Jury Instruction 13-C Is a Correct Statement of the Law.
'To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists, (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" Pecht,
2002 UT 20, f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). Accord
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 31. Likewise, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, "an
appellant must show that trial counsel 'rendered deficient performance which fell below an
objective standard of professional judgment,' and that the deficiency was ultimately
prejudicial." Pecht, 2002 UT 20, f 41 (quoting State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998). "A defendant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where
'the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. (quoting State
v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ^ 10,4 P.3d 778). Accord Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119. Thus, to

25

succeed, defendant must first establish that Instruction 13-C is erroneous. This he cannot do.
The issue before the jury was self-defense, that is, was defendant's use of deadly
force objectively reasonable? See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (1999) (setting out
requirements for claiming self-defense) (Addendum A). See also State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d
211, 216 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that under Utah law, a defendant's acts may not go
"beyond what was reasonably necessary to defend himself); $herard, 818 P.2d at 560-61
(reaffirming that objective standard governs self-defense). The trial court correctly instructed
the jury that defendant had no burden to prove he acted his self-defense; rather, the
prosecution had the "burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in
self-defense" (R.106). See Addendum B: Jury Instruction 13-E. The jury was properly
instructed that a person may only reasonably use force against "another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend himself against such
other's imminent use of unlawful force," and may only use deadly force "if he reasonably
believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious injury to himself (id.).
Finally, the jury was properly instructed that in judging the reasonableness of defendant's
actions, an objective standard applied, that is, "the viewpoint of a reasonable person under
the then existing circumstances" (id.). Defendant does not take issue with Instruction 13-E,
the self-defense instruction.
Defendant's complaint is with Instruction 13-C, the mutual combat/consensual
altercation instruction. For text of instruction, see supra at 21 & Addendum B. Defendant
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claims that Instruction 13-C was inappropriate because it unduly limited his reliance on selfdefense and further claims that because the instruction did not define what constitutes a
"duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation," the instruction was confusing. Utah
precedent and statutory law does not support defendant's arguments.
Instruction 13-C tracks verbatim section 76-5-104. See Addenda A & B. A jury
instruction which relies on statutory language is not erroneous "if the jury is not likely to be
confused or misled." Starks, 627 P.2d at 90 (other citations omitted). Here, the statutory
phrase "it is no defense to the prosecution" and the statutory terms "duel, mutual combat, or
consensual alteration" were neither misleading nor confusing. Indeed, the terminology has
been used by Utah courts for years. See, e.g., Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214 (describing selfdefense is a "defense to prosecution"); Sherard, 818 P.2d at 561 (approving instruction
which used the term "mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" to describe the
statutory limitation placed on claims of self-defense); Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 (concluding
that an instruction identical to Instruction 13-C did not mislead the jury). On its face,
Instruction 13-C was not erroneous.20
Moreover, terms of common usage need not be defined in an instruction unless the
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The State does not respond to defendant's undeveloped argument that section
76-5-104 is unconstitutional (Br.Aplt. at 28), especially in light of substantial Utah
precedent recognizing that a claim of self-defense is statutorily limited.
Additionally, defendant's unsupported assertion that Instruction 13-C shifted the
burden of proof to defendant, ignores Instruction 13-E's explicit admonition that the State
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See
Br.Aplt. at 29 and State's Addendum B.
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jury specifically requests clarification. See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1981)
(recognizing that, as a general rule, it is "unnecessary and undesirable for a trial judge to
volunteer definitions of terms of common usage for the jury").21 Here, the jury only sought
clarification of the phrase, "it is not a defense to the prosecution" {Addendum C). The jury
never requested a definition of "duel, mutual combat and consensual altercation." Therefore,
defendant's claim that the court plainly erred or counsel was ineffective for not defining
these common terms is specious.
Similarly, defendant's argument that Instruction 13-C unfairly limited his reliance on
self-defense is without legal support {Br.Aplt. at 28).
The general rule is that one who slays another, to be justified or excused on
the ground of self-defense, must be without fault in provoking the difficulty.
One who, as an aggressor, provokes an attack upon himself, brings on or
encourages a difficulty or quarrel with the deceased, or produces the occasion
which makes it necessary for him to take life, cannot assert that he acted in
self-defense and thus excuse or justify the homicide he has committed. A
person who, by provocative behavior, initiates a confrontation, even with no
intention of killing other [sic] person, cannot assert a claim of self-defense.
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Defendant argues that Couch and State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313 (Utah App.
1993), mandate the giving of definitional instructions {Br.Aplt. at 28-31). Defendant is
incorrect. Both cases state only that courts "should" respond to a jury's explicit request
for clarification of a critical term. See Couch, 635 P.2d at 95; Souza, 846 P.2d at 132021. In responding, however, the trial court may simply provide a dictionary. Souza, 846
P.2dat 1321. Accord UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(m) (a criminal trial judge retains the
discretion to decide when further instruction is necessary). Ultimately, the issue is not so
much whether the trial court responded, but whether the instructions as a whole were
adequate. Cf. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998) (erroneously citing
rule 47(n), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing court's responses to inquiries in
civil cases, but nevertheless holding the trial court's failure to respond to a jury inquiry
harmless).
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40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 148 (1999). Utah law has likewise long recognized that a
defendant who uses a firearm when engaging in a consensual altercation does so at his own
risk. If the consensual altercation results in a homicide, self-defense may not be used to
justify the killing unless (1) the defendant communicated an intent to withdraw from the
consensual altercation, (2) the defendant in fact withdrew from the fight, and (3) the
deceased nevertheless continued to use unlawful force. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(c)
(Addendum A). See Starks, 627 P.2d at 90-91 (affirming jury's rejection of Starks' selfdefense claim and noting that Starks had the right to arm himself in confronting the victim,
who had violent propensities, but "defendant's verbal and physical acts at the scene of the
homicide were sufficient to justify a instruction [based on Utah's self-defense and
consensual altercation provisions] that if the defendant were found to be the aggressor he
could not rely on the defense of self-defense"); Gibson, 565 P.2d at 786 (affirming jury's
rejection of Gibson's claim that he only stabbed the victim after the victim pulled a knife on
him as they wrestled and holding that "[e]ven if it should be accepted that the provocation
resulted in mutual combat, there is no indication that the defendant desired to withdraw nor
that he so indicated to the deceased''); Sherard, 818 P.2d at 560-61 (affirming jury's
rejection of Sherard's claim that the victim was the initial aggressor and holding that even
if the victim had "mutually agreed to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard's use of a
deadly weapon in that fight . . . even if [the victim] is viewed as the initial aggressor");
Pascual, 804 P.2d at 555-56 (recognizing that under Utah law, "the use of force of any kind
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is not justified if the person claiming [self] defense was the aggressor or was engaged in a
combat by agreement").
Significantly, Instruction 13-C, though correct, was a not complete statement of Utah
law. Even when read with Instruction 13-E, Instruction 13-C did not explain that a defendant
must withdraw from a mutual combat before he may claim self-defense. Compare UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-104 and Instructions 13-C & 13-E, with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(1)

& (2)(c). See also Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 (holding that instruction identical to Instruction
13-C was an incomplete statement of Utah law because the instruction only limited the use
of deadly force, whereas Utah self-defense law actually prohibits the use of any unjustified
force). Thus, as written, Instruction 13-C "overstated the available defenses." See id.
(applying same characterization to instruction identical to Instruction 13-C). Defendant
cannot complain that the trial court plainly erred or his counsel was ineffective for providing
him with more than the law allowed. See id. (holding that use of identically worded
instruction was harmless in that it provided a greater benefit to defendant than what he was
entitled under Utah law). See also State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Utah 1994);
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989); and State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987) (all refusing to review jury instruction where defendant did not object to
instruction as given or offer an alternative instruction).
(C) Because Instruction 13-C Correctly Stated the Law, No Supplemental
Instruction Was Mandated.
In this case, the jury made two inquiries concerning Jury Instruction 13-C. In
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response to the first note, the court, with counsel's approval, told the jury to rely on the plain
language of 13-C and to read the instructions as a whole (R. 1328-29 & Addendum C). On
appeal, defendant does not challenge the court's handling of the initial inquiry.
Subsequently, the jury asked if the phrase "it is no defense to the prosecution" meant that it
was "no help to the prosecution" (id.). Defendant's trial counsel persuaded the court to give
a supplemental instruction (R. 1362-64). A proposed instruction was drafted, which read:
It is the law, as stated in Instruction No. 13-C, that dueling, mutual combat, or
a consensual altercation shall be no defense to a criminal charge of Murder,
if the accused employed a dangerous weapon in causing the death of another
during a duel, mutual combat or consensual altercation. However, you are
also instructed that in this case, you must consider whether or not the
Defendant was justified in the use of deadly force under the law of selfdefense as set forth in Instruction No. 13-E.
(R. 111). After the instruction was prepared, but before it could be read to the jury, the jury
announced it had reached a verdict (R. 1362-64). The court asked if counsel had "anything"
before the verdict was returned; defense counsel responded in the negative (R.1329). The
verdict was then read (R. 1330, 1363-64). Before the jury was excused, the court again
asked counsel if he had any motions and he again stated he did not (R. 1331-32, 1363-64).
See Statement of the Case, supra at 4-5.
A criminal trial judge has more discretion in responding to a jury's inquiry than a civil
trial judge. When a jury seeks clarification of a point of law during deliberations in a civil
trial, the jury may insist that they be returned to the courtroom where "the information
required must be given." See UTAH R. CIVIL P. 47(n) (emphasis added) (Addendum A). In
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contrast, when a jury seeks clarification in a criminal trial:
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court, where, in
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given.
UTAH

R. CRIM. P. 17(m) (emphasis added) {Addendum A). See Kozik, 688 P.2d at 460

(recognizing discretion granted to trial court judge by rule 17(m); Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3-4
(same). But see Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1230 (erroneously citing only to the civil rule, but
nevertheless finding criminal court's failure to respond to jury inquiry harmless).
Here, the court fully complied with the criminal rule. In response to the first note, the
court effectively advised the jury that further instruction would not be given. The second
time, the court and counsel prepared a supplemental instruction, which used slightly different
language to convey the substantive equivalent of the court's prior instructions. While
defendant now takes exception to the supplemental instruction as drafted, see Subsection
1(B), supra, the legal correctness of the proposed instruction is not at issue because the
instruction was never given. Instead, the issue is whether the court plainly erred or counsel
was ineffective when they concluded that the jury no longer sought clarification of
Instruction 13-C once they reached a verdict.
Rule 17(m) requires a court to respond in some manner to a jury inquiry, but only to
the degree that a jury question is pending before it. Here, the jury implicitly withdrew their
prior request for clarification when they informed the court they had reached a verdict.
Additionally, defendant implicitly agreed that further instructions were unnecessary when
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he did not object to the verdict's return. This was not surprising, since the instructions as
given and any confusion expressed by the jury benefitted defendant. See Litherland, 2000
UT 76,^1 i\\ State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991) (both recognizing that
a court does not commit plain error by respecting counsel's strategic choices). Given these
circumstances, it was reasonable for the court to assume that both the jury and defendant
waived their prior requests for clarification.
(D) In Any Case, Defendant Has Not Established Prejudice.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in receiving the verdict without
informing the jury that it was prepared to respond to their question, the error is not
prejudicial. As previously discussed, the meaning of mutual combat and consensual
altercation were not at issue and thus, no definition was required of those terms. At best,
rule 17(m) simply required a response to the question posed, i.e. what did "it is no defense
to the prosecution mean."22 The proposed supplemental instruction answered this question
by explaining that the phrase meant "it is not defense to a charge of murder" (R. 111). Thus,
if the proposed instruction had been given, it would not have benefitted defendant. See
Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 and Subsection 1(B), supra at 30.
In sum, defendant was not entitled to the supplemental instruction he now proposes.
22

The State does not concede that the court was required to provide a
supplemental instruction. Pursuant to rule 17(m), the court could refuse further
instruction as it did the first time. But to the extent that a substantive response is
encouraged, the proposed supplemental instruction was sufficient. See Porter, 705 P.2d
at 1176-77; Lucero, 866 P.2d at 4 (holding alleged rule 17(m) error harmless where
instructions were not erroneous).
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At best, he was entitled to the supplemental instruction prepared below - an instruction
which simply clarified that defendant was not entitled to claim self-defense if he used a
firearm in a mutual combat. Because the drafted instruction would not have benefitted
defendant, he suffered no prejudice from its omission.
POINT II
UTAH RECOGNIZES NO SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY APPEAL; TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANT PRESENTS A
DUE PROCESS CLAIM, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL MEETS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Relying on Harrisv. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994), defendant asserts that
he has been deprived of a purported right to a speedy appeal because his direct appeal has
been pending for nine years {BrAplt. at 56-47). Defendant presumes that Harris creates a
constitutional right that this Court must recognize and enforce. However, the United States
Supreme Court and Utah appellate courts have never recognized a Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy appeal. Even if such a right existed, defendant has not demonstrated its violation
in this case or sought a legally and factually supported remedy. Moreover, to the extent
defendant presents a due process claim, the appellate process in this case meets the
constitutional standard.
Certainly, an extraordinary length of time has elapsed since defendant's conviction
in December 1992. But contrary to defendant's claim, the reasons for that delay have little
to do with the State. Instead, the majority of the delays are directly attributable to
defendant's repetitive requests for new counsel. See Statement of the Case, supra at 6-8.
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Additionally, for a substantial portion of that time - from August 1996 to June 2000 - no
direct appeal was pending. Defendant's current appeal, Case No. 2000520-CA, has only
been pending since June 5,2000. See id. at 9. Consequently, while nine years have elapsed
since defendant's conviction, the time relevant to a speedy appeal or due process claim is,
at defendant's best, less than five years, and by the State's calculations, less than two years.
In any case, defendant's arguments may be summarily rejected for lack of proper
briefing. If their substance is considered, the arguments are without merit.23
(A) Defendant's Claims Are Not Adequately Briefed Nor the Evidence
Properly Marshaled.
Defendant has not complied with this Court's briefing and marshaling requirements
and, therefore, the Court may summarily refuse to consider the merits of defendant's claims.
See Point 1(A), supra, for briefing and marshaling requirements.
Defendant presents his speedy appeal and due process claims by quoting massive
passages from non-controlling case law. See Br.Aplt. at 32-40, 43-47. To the extent he
cites controlling authority, the references are contained in quotations and presented without
argument or analysis. See Br.Aplt. at 36, 39, & 45. Defendant is not entitled to make this
Court a "depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450.
23

Defendant additionally claims that omissions in the appellate record violate his
right to due process (Br.Aplt. at 24-25\ 49). This argument is frivolous. As previously
explained, the only significant missing document, the 1994 Order Supplementing Record,
has been replaced. See Addendum D. The remaining missing documents are
insignificant. See note 8, supra at 8.
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Additionally, defendant's claims of unconstitutional delay are fact-dependent. Yet,
defendant recites only those facts he finds favorable, while failing to acknowledge the
substantial facts which undermine his argument. Compare State ys Statement of the Case,
with Br.Aplt. at 3-4, 36, 40-42 & 44. Defendant's failure to fairly present the procedural
history precludes consideration of the merits of his claims. Cf. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 17
& n.2. Alternatively, defendant's arguments fail on their merits.
(B) No Controlling Authority Recognizes a Right to a Speedy Appeal and
Defendant Presents No Reason to Craft Such a Right in This Case.
Relying solely on authority from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, defendant
asserts that the "State" (the public defenders and courts) have deprived defendant of his right
to a speedy appeal and, therefore, he is entitled not only to reversal of his conviction but also
a bar to a retrial (Br.Aplt. at 44-45 & 49).
This Court is not bound to follow federal circuit court case law. Controlling law is
determined by the Utah appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court, neither of
which have recognized a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy appeal. Indeed, the Sixth
Amendment does not compel states to grant a right to appeal from a criminal conviction,
much less a speedy appeal. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Nevertheless,
if an appeal right is granted, it must comport with rudimentary due process. Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387,393(1985).
To succeed on his Sixth Amendment claim, defendant must demonstrate why this
Court should recognize a right not previously recognized by any Utah appellate court or
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imposed on the states by the federal supreme court. Defendant fails to make any such
argument. As discussed in Subsection 11(A), supra, that failure independently defeats his
claim. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 489 ("nominally" referring to state constitutional arguments
is insufficient to consider them on their merits); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984) (refusing to consider state constitutional claim presented without supporting
legal analysis or authority).
In addition, the procedural posture of this case presents no reason to address whether
a speedy appeal right exists because finalizing the present appeal will vindicate the purported
right. In contrast to the instant appeal, Harris addressed state convicts' collateral claims that
they were deprived of their right to appeal by the systematic breakdown of the Oklahoma
appellate system. 15 F.3d at 1548-49. Harris's recognition of a Sixth Amendment speedy
appeal right was the mechanism by which the federal court could excuse the petitioners'
procedural failure to exhaust their state remedies before seeking the federal writ. 15 P.3d
at 1554-57.

The Tenth Circuit recognized that the appropriate remedy for an

unconstitutionally delayed appeal generally is a court order coercing the delaying court into
action, that is, a conditional federal writ ordering a petitioner's release unless the state court
completes the petitioner's appeal within a specified time. Id. at 1566-67. At the same time,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that petitioners whose convictions had been affirmed by the state
courts were entitled to no relief because the affirmance established that they had been held
under a valid judgment the entire time. Id. at 1566. Unconditional release - reversal and
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release without retrial - was only justified if a state petitioner demonstrated credible grounds
for reversal and established that the appellate delay actually impaired the petitioner's
grounds for reversal or his defenses if retried. Id. at 1563-64.
Here, defendant has established no //arm-like situation. Only one of defendant's
appointed counsel, Thomas Blakely, failed to do a required act. That defect was cured when
defendant was resentenced nunc pro tunc and his right to appeal reinstated. Cf. Harris, 15
F.3d at 1547 (recognizing that Sixth Amendment defect is cured once omission is rectified).
But apart from Mr. Blakely, defendant has established no individual ineffectiveness or
systemic breakdown in connection with his other appellate attorneys. And without a
showing of a systemic breakdown or widespread individual ineffectiveness, defendant does
not even fall within Harris's recognition that a substantial delay may give rise to a rebuttable
presumption of a Sixth Amendment violation.24 See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1555-56.
Even if this Court were to recognize a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy appeal,
defendant has not established that the right was violated here, or even if violated, that the
violation has not been remedied. Whatever individual delays defendant claims, those delays
are not representative of a systemic breakdown of the appellate process and, in any case,

24

Under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1556, a period of appellate delay in excess of two
years from the notice of appeal would create a rebuttable presumption that the state
appellate system was not "effective" and, therefore, violative of the Sixth Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the two-year period was not a bright line
rule. Id. The court determined the presumption applicable based on its prior judicial
determination that the entire Oklahoma appellate system was in "crisis." Id. at 1550 &
1556.
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have been remedied by the filing of defendant's brief. Cf Harris, 15 F.3d at 1547. And
because defendant has failed to establish that reversal error occurred in his trial see Point
I supra, the length of any delay which proceeded the filing of defendant's non-meritorious
brief is irrelevant. See Campiti v. Commonwealth, 687 N.E.2d 268, 269 (Mass. 1997)
(recognizing that "it would be strange indeed if we said that delay in processing the
defendant's nonmeritorious appeal warrants reversal of his conviction") (citation and
quotation marks omitted). For Sixth Amendment purposes, his appeal was not ineffective,
just unsuccessful. Cf. State v. Julian,11 \ P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1989) (citingMedina, 738
P.2d at 1024, for proposition that a defendant cannot complain his defense was ineffective
merely because it was unsuccessful).
(C) To the Extent Defendant Claims a Due Process Violation, The Appellate
Process in This Case Meets the Constitutional Standard.
Apart from the Sixth Amendment, Harris also recognized that inordinate appellate
delay may establish an independent due process violation. 15 F.3d at 1557-65. To the extent
defendant claims a due process violation, the appellate process in this case meets the
constitutional standard.
Harris recognized that unlike the two-year presumption used to excuse procedural
exhaustion under a Sixth Amendment claim, the length of appellate delay is but one factor
to be considered for due process analysis. 15 F.3d at 1560 n. 10. By itself, excessive delay
does not determine the ultimate constitutional issue. Id, Accord Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968
F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir.) (finding thirteen-year appellate delay was harmless), cert, denied,
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506 U.S. 1024 (1992). Instead, relying on speedy trial analysis set out in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 53 0 (1972), the Tenth Circuit looked to four factors in determining if the delay
in Harris' case violated due process. Those factors were: (1) the length of appellate delay;
(2) the reason for the delay and whether the reason is justified; (3) whether the defendant
asserted a desire for a timely appeal; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant, in
the sense that it caused him oppressive incarceration, constitutionally cognizable anxiety and
concern, and impaired his grounds for appeal or his ability to defend on retrial. Harris, 15
F.3d at 1558-59. Application of those factors to the present case establishes that defendant
has been accorded all due process to which he is entitled.25
In addressing the length of delay, defendant lumps together all time periods since his
conviction. See Br.Aplt. at 36. This is improper. Whatever defects occurred in defendant's
first appeal, Case No. 931357-CA, those defects were cured when defendant elected to be
resentenced nunc pro tunc and allowed to seek a new appeal. Thus, the proper period to
consider begins with the filing of the notice of appeal in this appeal, that is, June 5, 2000.
The elapsed time from notice to the filing of defendant's brief is approximately eighteen
months. Even under Harris, an 1 Vi year delay is acceptable. Id. at 1562. Thus, the length

2:>

The State does not concede that Barker speedy trial analysis is necessarily the
appropriate framework for analyzing a due process claim of appellate delay. See Cody v.
Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting "obvious differences" between
the rights to a speedy trial and a speedy appeal and consequently holding that "Barker
criteria must be applied differently in analyzing the constitutional significance of
appellate, as opposed to trial, delay"). The State merely assumes Barker's applicability
for purposes of argument.
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of time is not inordinate.
If, however, the delays from the first appeal are combined with the present appeal, a
more substantial period of delay has occurred, though again, not the nine years claimed by
defendant. Appellate delay necessarily requires an appeal to be pending. From August 8,
1996, to June 5, 2000, no appeal was pending in this case. See supra at 8. Combining the
two appeals but excising the time when no appeal was pending, the length of delay would
equal approximately five years. The State does not dispute that five years is inordinate for
an appeal of this nature. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562 (recognizing that a complex case may
warrant additional appellate delay). Nevertheless, when the other factors are considered, no
constitutional violation is established.
Under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562, once inordinate delay is established, a lower burden
of proof is allowed for the other Barker factors. Assuming arguendo that in this case, the
period of appellate delay is determined to be inordinate and a lower burden of proof applies,
defendant still cannot establish a due process violation.
The second factor is the reason for the delay. Under traditional analysis, a court must
always consider the reasons for the delay, including who precipitated the delay. See State
v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 53,^6 (recognizing that any delays caused by defendant toll the
applicable time period under the detainer statute); State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[j
6 & 8, 34 P.3d 790 (recognizing that delays caused by defendant's motions are excluded
from speedy trial calculations); State v. Trafney, 799 P.2d 704, 707-08 (Utah 1990) (same).
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In Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562, the court attributed all delays to the government based on the
Tenth Circuit's prior determination of systemic chaos in Oklahoma's indigent defendant
process. Here, no such systemic problem exists. The reasons for the delays, therefore, must
be individually examined and individually attributed.
But for Mr. Blakely, defendant's attorneys all appeared to be working diligently on
his appeal. Mr. Wright filed a notice of appeal and a request for transcript before arranging
for the timely substitution of Mr. Miller pursuant to their contractual obligations as public
defenders. See Statement of the Case, supra at 6-7. Mr. Miller filed a docketing statement,
reviewed the substantial record, and then properly determined that additional
supplementation of the record was necessary (id.). But before he could complete the
supplementation, defendant insisted that he be removed (id.).

The trial court never

considered the merits of defendant's motion because Mr. Miller died. Mr. Holm was then
appointed. He completed the record supplementation, moved for a rule 23B remand, and
presumptively was working diligently to complete the brief when defendant moved for his
removal. See supra at 7. Mr. Holm warned defendant that if he insisted on a new attorney,
defendant's appellate process would be delayed (R. 1387). Defendant proceeded anyway,
twice insisting one week before the brief was due that new counsel be appointed. See supra
at 7. Faced with defendant's continued opposition to Mr. Holm, the trial court ultimately
provided new counsel (id.). Up to this point, delays in the appeal are attributable to
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defendant. Those delays total at minimum seventeen months/ 6
Mr. Blakely was then appointed to represent defendant. The trial court ultimatelyfound Mr. Blakely to be ineffective and granted defendant's request to be resentenced nunc
pro tunc. For purposes of argument, the period that Mr. Blakely represented defendant, a
period of approximately four months, will be attributed to the State. See Statement of the
Case, supra at 8.
Following dismissal of Case No. 931357-CA, no appeal was pending for the next four
years. The appellate time period began to run again on June 5, 2000, the date the notice of
appeal was filed in this case, Case No. 20000520-CA. And while present defense counsel
faced a contempt order before filing defendant's brief, it appears that counsel did not lack
diligence in preparing defendant's brief, only knowledge of how to properly seek an
enlargement of time in which to file it. See Order to Show Cause, Case No. 20000520-CA,
dated 11/15/01 and Motion to Strike Order to Show Cause, dated 11/27/01. In any case,
even under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1547, this Court's acceptance of defendant's brief cured any
procedural deficiency and, therefore, defendant has suffered no prejudice.
In sum, defendant can establish, at best, that four months of an approximate five year
delay are attributable to the State. In contrast, defendant is responsible for at least seventeen
months of delay. The remaining periods of delay represent time periods reasonably
26

The seventeen months represents only the time periods between the filing and
disposition of defendant's pro se motions to remove counsel. However, every
substitution of counsel resulted in additional delays as each new attorney assigned "came
up to speed."
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necessary for each of defendant's new counsel to reasonably review the 1500-page record,
conduct research, and begin preparation of the brief. Indeed, the record supports that but for
defendant's pro se motions, Mr. Holm would have filed defendant's brief on January 10,
1996 (Addendum F). The primary reason it was not was defendant. See People v. Holt, 937
P.2d 213, 271 (Calif.) (rejecting Harris v. Champion approach and holding that appellate
delay was reasonably related to courts' efforts to secure competent counsel for defendant in
capital case), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1017 (1997).
The third factor, whether defendant requested a speedy appeal, can be summarily
considered. The State does not dispute that defendant stated that he wanted his appeal to
progress. But defendant's actions negated his words. Defendant knew that each time he
requested new counsel, his appeal would be delayed. Yet, he persisted.
The fourth factor is really the most significant, for without actual prejudice, the due
process violation is harmless. See Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1170 n.7 (3rd Cir.)
(concluding that, based on the specific facts of the case, the best remedy for the speedy
appeal violation was to grant a new trial, but recognizing that if the petitioner "had received
an adequate and effective, through excessively delayed appeal, then the issue of prejudice
would become more difficult"), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 905 (1995); Harris, 15 F.3d at 156466 (recognizing that to be prejudicial, appellate delay must substantially impact the fairness
of the appellate process or substantially impair the ability to present a defense upon retrial);
Muwwakkil, 968 F.2d at 285 (same). Here, defendant has not established even a colorable
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claim of prejudice. He establishes no meritorious issue on appeal. See Point I supra.
Therefore, the nine years he has been held is warranted. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1566;
Campiti, 687 N.E.2d at 269. And even if he demonstrated reversible error, he has not
established any constitutional justification to bar retrial. Cody, 936 F.2d at 722 (recognizing
that even when a due process violation is found, reversal and unconditional release would
only be appropriate if the delay "so tainted the appellate process as to affect the
constitutional integrity of the appeal itself) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Merely
allegedly that some witnesses, possibly inebriated at the time of the murder, gave conflicting
accounts of the event during the original trial, or that other witnesses' memories may have
faded, is insufficient. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 564 (recognizing that if "particularized
prejudice" occurred during normal period of appeal, no due process violation results since
prejudice would have occurred even absent any subsequent delay in the appeal); Cousart v.
Hammock, 745 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding any alleged due process violation
harmless where despite "lengthy" delay in appeal, "transcript of previous testimony by any
missing witnesses was available" and concluding that no prejudice necessarily results "from
the use of transcript rather than live testimony"). Moreover, contrary to defendant's
summary attacks on the allegedly "conflicting" evidence, see Br.Aplt. at 44, that evidence
established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Statement of Facts.
In sum, while the delay since defendant's conviction has been substantial, the
appellate process has been constitutional.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction for murder should be affirmed.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-2-402

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony
defined.
( D A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person
as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(a) initially provokes the use offeree against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission
or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement,
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force; and
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, constitute "combat by agreement":
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal
right to be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c).
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape,
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to
create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not
constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time
unlawful entry is made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.

76-5-104. Consensual altercation.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged in an ultimate fighting
match as defined in Section 76-9-705.
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Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence:
(2) in prosecutions tor ottenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of am infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any
number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in
the following order
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has
rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the
court, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument.
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each
party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new trial ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors sire permitted to separate
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
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be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence,
except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession
of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations.
As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct
the jury on taking and using notes.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and
the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
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Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of
the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a
preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of tnal.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors
who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the
same time and in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall
be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath,
and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors.
An alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged
when the jury retires to consider its verdict unless the parties stipulate
otherwise and the court approves the stipulation. The court may withhold from
the jurors the identity of the alternate jurors until the jurors begin deliberations. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is entitled to one
peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror.
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular
juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and
amy other person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such
challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the following
grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same
grounds.
( D A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person
competent as a juror.
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(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to
an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either
party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or
obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service
charge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness
therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or
in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or
citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No
person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the
juror can and will act impartially and fairly.
(g) Selection ofjury. The judge shall determine the method of selecting the
jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial.
The following methods for selection are not exclusive.
(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of jurors
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for
cause that may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for
cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause
outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained,
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be
challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the
plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates,
for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause that
may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the
plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by
computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order.
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(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after impaneling the jury and
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform the duties of
a juror and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with
the other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be
tried with a new jury.
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on
any subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless
by order of the court, the officer having charge of them must not make or allow
to be made any communication to them with respect to the action, except to ask
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and the officer must not, before the
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(m) Exhibits taken by jury; notes. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury
may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have
been received as evidence in the cause, except exhibits that should not, in the
opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual
size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits
upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes during the trial and to have
those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using
notes.
(n) Additional instructions ofjury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated
on the record.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court,
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule
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48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreperson; the verdict
must be in writing, signed by the foreperson, and must be read by the clerk to
the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may
require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking
each juror if it is the juror's verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an
insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out
again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from
the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be
sent out again.
(Amended effective January 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.)

Addendum B

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0URT2M AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO,
Defendant,

Case No. 921500702

1. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
These jury instructions are given to assist you in your deliberations in this case. The
order in which these instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance,
and you should not single out any one and ignore the rest. Consider the instructions as a whole.
These instructions are intended to be applicable to either gender. Any use of the male
pronouns (he, him, his) should be read to include the appropriate female pronoun if needed.
2. ROLE OF JUDGE AND JURY
This is a criminal trial. In every criminal trial there is a disagreement about whether
someone has committed a crime. You must decide that question in the case.
My duty as judge requires me to instruct you concerning the law which applies to this
It
is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you.
case.
Your function is to decide the issues of fact presented by the charges in the Information
and the defendant's plea of "not guilty" thereto. You should not be influenced by pity for the
defendant or by prejudice against the defendant. The fact that an Information has been filed or
that the defendant has been brought before the court to stand trial cannot be considered by you
as any evidence of guilt.
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as I state
it to you. You are expected to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the evidence and
applying the law applicable to this case to reach a just verdict, regardless of what the
consequences of the verdict may be.

3. RECESSES
From time to time during the trial we will take recesses. During the recesses you are
to be governed by the following admonition:
"You are admonished that during this recess or any future break in the trial, you are not
to discuss this case with anyone, or among yourselves, nor to form or express any opinion as
to the innocence or guilt of the defendant(s) until the matter is submitted to you. You are not
to attempt to learn anything about this case outside this courtroom or visit any location
mentioned in the trial. Your are to avoid and disregard any media or other reports about the
trial."
I also ask that you have no conversations at all with the attorneys, the witnesses, or the
defendant. Please do not discuss this case or the law in general with the bailiff, the clerks or
any of the persons involved with the trial as it progresses.
4. THE INFORMATION
The Defendant has been charged with the commission of a crime in a formal document
called an Information. In a moment the clerk will read the Information in this case to you.
Bear in mind that this is only an allegation to which the defendant has plead "Not Guilty". You
may not consider the filing of the Information or the defendant's not guilty plea as evidence.
You will hear the evidence from the witness stand and through any exhibits admitted during the
trial.
(CLERK READS THE INFORMATION)
5. EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS
You are the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must determine the facts from the
evidence produced here in court. If any evidence shall be ordered by me to be stricken, you
must disregard it entirely.
No statement made by the attorneys should be regarded as evidence. However, if
counsel for both parties stipulate or agree to any fact, you should regard that fact as being
conclusively proven.
6. OPINION OF THE JUDGE
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact. You must decide such questions for
yourselves from the evidence without regard to what you may believe I think about it. My
opinion is immaterial. If any statement or ruling of mine seemed to indicate that I held an
opinion of any fact, this was unintentional and you are instructed to disregard it.
(OPENING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSE1)
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7. CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE
You should only consider evidence admitted by the court. You should not consider
evidence which may be rejected, or speculate as to the reason for objections, or the court's
ruling on them.
Where there is conflict in the evidence, you should reconcile such conflict if you
reasonably can. But, where the conflict cannot be reasonably reconciled, you still must finally
determine from the evidence what the ultimate facts are.
You are not bound to believe a witness unless that witness' testimony is reasonable in
view of all the facts. You may believe one witness against many, or many witnesses against a
few, in accordance with your honest convictions.
8. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
In judging the credibility or believability of any witness, you should consider the witness'
possible bias, possible interest in the result of the trial, and any possible motive the witness may
have to testify in a particular way. You may consider the witness' demeanor on the witness
stand, the reasonableness of the statements, opportunity to know, ability to understand and
capacity to remember. You should also consider whether the witness gave self-contradicting
testimony, or was contradicted by other evidence. From all this you should determine any
witness' credibility, and what weight you should give the testimony. If you should believe that
a witness has intentionally testified falsely as to any material fact, you may disregard all of that
witness' testimony, or give it such weight as you think it is entitled.
9. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence follows the defendant through the
trial until and unless the prosecution has met this burden.
(TESTIMONY FROM WITNESSES)
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10. REASONABLE DOUBT
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a
reasonable doubt as to whether guilt is satisfactorily shown a defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the state to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty. A reasonable doubt means a doubt that is based upon reason and one that
is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not one that is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and eliminates all reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable people would entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or the lack of evidence in the case.

11. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT
The defendant is a competent witness in this matter whose testimony should be given the
same consideration as you give to any other witness. You may test the defendant's credibility
or the weight of the defendant's testimony as you would that of any other witnesses as given to
you heretofore in these instructions.
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12. ACT AND INTENT
In every crime there must be a joint operation of act and intent. The intent or intention
is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense and the sound mind and discretion
of the accused.
A person is guilty of an offense when the conduct is prohibited by law and the actor
engages in the conduct with some kind of criminal intent. That is to say the actor engages in
the conduct intentionally,or knowingly with respect to each element of the offence as the definition of an offense requires.
Those terms are defined for you as follows:
A person engages in conduct "intentionally" or with intent, when it is the person's
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when the person is aware
that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO. 13-A
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of
COUNT I: MURDER, a 1st Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended
Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the elements listed in paragraph 1, below, and the
elements listed in either paragraph 2, 3, or 4, below.
1. That said act did occur on or about the 28th day of
July, 1992, in Washington County, State of Utah, although the
exact date is immaterial.
2. That the Defendant did intentionally or knowingly cause
the death of another, Larry Gilstrap, by use of a firearm; or
3 That the Defendant, intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, Larry Gilstrap, did commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life that caused the death of another, Larry
Gilstrap, by use of a firearm; or
4. That the Defendant, acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, did engage in
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and
thereby caused the death of another, Larry Gilstrap, by use of a
firearm.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
each and every one of the elements in paragraph 1 and any one or
more of the elements in paragraph 2,or 3, or 4,each in the
alternative, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. If, on
the other hand, you are convinced of the truth of the elements in
paragraph 1 and any one or more of the elements in paragraphs 2,
3, or 4, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
Defendant guilty of the offense alleged.

A
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 3** B

In these Instructions, certain words and phrases are used
which require definitions in order that you may properly understand
the nature of the crime charged and in order that you may properly
apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as
you may find them from the evidence.

These definitions are as

follows:
"Intent" means intention, design, resolve, a
determination of the mind.
"Intentionally" means a person acts intentionally with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
"Knowingly" means a person acts knowingly or with
knowledge with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances and that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes
speech.
"Conduct" means an act or omission.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.

4 '^

INSTRUCTION NO.
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You are instructed that it is no defense to the
prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual
combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the
duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon was used. A
firearm is a dangerous weapon.
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INSTRUCTION
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You are instructed that voluntary intoxication shall not
be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication negates
the existence of the mental state which is an element of the
offense.
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You are instructed that the Defendant is justified in using
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to defend himself against such
other's

imminent

use

of unlawful

force; however, a person

is

justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that the
force is necessary to prevent death or serious injury to himself, or
to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
If you find that the Defendant Richard Frausto did reasonably
believe that such force was necessary either to defend himself or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony then you must find the
Defendant Richard Frausto not guilty.
You are instructed that with respect to the burden of proof, if
any evidence is produced by the State or the Defendant that raises
the issue of self-defense, the State then has the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense.
You are instructed that the Defendant does not have a burden of
proving that the killing was in self-defense.
prove beyond

a reasonable

doubt

that

If the State fails to

the killing

was

not

self-defense, the Defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified in
using force that would cause death or serious bodily injury
against another shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.

in

INSTRUCTION NO.

A forcible felony is defined as an offense including aggravated
assault, aggravated

murder, manslaughter,

and

any

other

felony

offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person
so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily
injury.
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14. TWO REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS
If the evidence in this case is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of
which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant,
while the other points to innocence, it is your duty under the law to adopt the interpretation
which will admit to the defendant's innocence and reject that which points to guilt.
You will note that this rule applies only when both of the possible opposing conclusions
appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should
appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere
to the reasonable conclusion and to reject the unreasonable. Bear in mind, however, that even
if the reasonable deduction or conclusion points to the defendant's guilt, the entire proof must
carry the convincing force required by law to support a verdict of guilty.
(CLOSING ARGUMENTS)

15.

USE OF NOTES

During this trial I have permitted you to take notes. Many Courts do not permit notetaking by jurors„and a word of caution is in order. There is always a tendency to attach undue
importance to matters which one has written down. Some testimony, not written down, takes
on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. Therefore, you are
instructed that your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you should not
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in
evaluating the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence, and are by no means
a complete outline of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your
memory should be your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision
in this case.

16. CONDUCT OF JURORS
Your verdict must express the individual opinion of each of you. It is rarely productive
of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of opinion on
the case or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at
the outset, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it is incorrect. When you have first reached a conclusion as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you should not lightly change it merely because other
jurors may disagree with you. Discuss your opinions with open minds and if you are satisfied
that your first conclusion was wrong, then you may change it. Remember that you are not
partisans or advocates, but rather, judges.

17. JURY DELIBERATIONS
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of yourselves to act as foreperson
to preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you all agree. The foreperson
has no more power than any other juror. In this criminal case your verdict must be unanimous.
Your verdict must be in writing and must be returned to the court.
Forms of verdict have been prepared for your use in this case. Your foreperson will sign
that verdict which correctly sets forth your decision. I will now read to you the verdict form.
It is not necessary for anyone other than the foreperson to sign your verdict. When you

have arrived at a verdict, notify the bailiff, by knocking on the door to the jury room, that you
are ready to report to the court
DATED this 18th day of December, 1992.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION

It is the law, as stated in Instruction No. 13-C, that dueling, mutual
combat, or a consensual altercation shall be no defense to a criminal
charge of Murder, if

the accused employed a dangerous weapon in causing

the death of another during a duel, mutual combat or consensual altercation.
However, you are also instructed that in this case, you must consider whether
or not the Defendant was justified in the use of deadly force under the law
of self-defense as set forth in Instruction No. 13-E.

Addendum D
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T COUKT
WASHINGTON

COUNTY,

^J

Til L

IN AND

FOR

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING

RECORD

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD ANDREW

FRAUSTO,
Criminal No.

921500702

Defendant.

D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n to Supplement Record came on regularly
for

hearing

before

represented

by

the

W.

court

Brent

on

July

13,

Langston,

1994.

Deputy

Plaintiff

Washington

was

County

Attorney, and D e f e n d a n t w a s represented by Floyd W Holm and Michael
W.

Park.

appearing

Being

IS

above-entitled
1.

said

HEREBY

in

the

ORDERED

that

the

a c t i o n be supplemented
During

virtually

2.
time,

advised

premises

and

good

cause

therefor,
IT

jury,

fully

in

the

After

a question

the

was

the

record

an

instruction

language

of

Section

sent

out

had
to

in

the

given

to

t^s

Court

was

76-5-104

deliberated
the

appeal

as follows:

trial,

jury

on

for

of

some

as to the

the

Utan

period

cf

meaning

of

instruction.
3.

After

consultation

136:

with

counsel,

to

the

best

of

recollection cf counsel for Defendant, the Court sent back a reply
that, essentially said the jurors should read the instruction and
consider it in conjunction with all other instructions which had
been given.
4.

Some time later, the jurors sent out another question

concerning the same instruction.
5.

Again, counsel for the Defendant and for the State
into the Court f s chambers

were called

for consultation with the

Court in order to formulate a reply.
6.

Counsel for Defendant was able to persuade the Court

that a clarifying and supplemental instruction should be given to
the

jurors,

to

clarify

in

their

minds

the

meaning

of

that

instruction.
7.

During the second consultation while

the

attorney

for the prosecution and counsel for Defendant were present with the
Court,

the Court

ultimately

spent

designing

some

time doing

a supplemental

additional

instruction

research

and

clarifying

the

instruction in question.
8.
the

Said session was not transcribed, but upon explaining

meaning

of

the

supplemental

instruction,

and

over

the

prosecutor's objection, the Court informed counsel it would oall
the jury back into session and read the new Instruction to the jury
in open court.
9.

As

counsel

for

Defendant

was

returning

to

the

courtroom he was informed by the Court Clerk that the jury had a
verdict.
10.

When the jury came back into Court, the supplemental

1363

instruction was not read to the j-rcrs and no metier, was -sie
defense counsel to have the supplemental instruction read to *
jury, but a verdict rendered instead.

DATED this

/2

day of

U L/^

BY THE COURT:

JAKI
District Judge

L 36-*

, 1<.994.

therefore, stipulate that pursuant to rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
attached copy should now be incorporated into the appellate record and designated as
R. 1362-1364.

to*?

DATED this

[_ day of February, 2002.

e

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

y

^Brenda S. Whfteley
Attorney for Defendant/Appella

jstine F. Soltis
jtant Attorney General
ley for Plaintiff/Appellee

F!LED
Utah Court oi >vcoeJ?

FEB 2 0 2002
ORDER

Pauteto Stagg
Cleric of the Court

Based on the stipulation of the parties and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attached copy of Order Supplementing
Record be substituted for the missing onginal and designated as R. 1362-64 of the
appellate record.

-0 day of February, 2002.

DATED this ^

FOR THE COURT:
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Addendum E

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO
CASE NUMBER 921500702 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-203 - MURDER
1st Degree Felony Plea: August 12, 1992 Not Guilty
Disposition: December 18, 1992 {Guilty - Jury}
Charge 2 - 76-10-503 - POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: August 12, 1992 Dismissed
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JAMES L. SHUMATE
PARTIES
Defendant - RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO
IVINS, UT
Represented by: THOMAS A BLAKELY
Represented by: BRENDA S WHITELEY
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: TARA DUGAN
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO
Offense tracking number: 585758
Date of Birth: June 30, 1954
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY ATTORNEY
Prosecuting Agency: WASHINGTON COUNTY
Agency Case Number:
Violation Date: July 28, 1992
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TRUST TOTALS

Trust Due:

1,078.00

.Amount Paid:
1.078.00
Credit:
0.00
Trust Balance Due:
0.00
Balance Payable:
0.00

TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Reporter Fees
Recipient: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
Amount Due:
1,078.00
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Paid In:
Paid Out:

1,078.00
1,078.00

CASE NOTE
COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 930357-CA (DISMISSED)
PROCEEDINGS
08-11-92 Information filed
08-11 -92 Judge SHUMATE assigned.
convert
08-11-92 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover.
julies
08-11-92 Note: ARR
scheduled for 8/19/92 at 9:00 A in room
with JS
julies
08-11-92 Note: ** REFER TO HARD COPY - DELETED IN CIRCUIT COURT
jbh
08-12-92 Note: Fel Arraignment JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
julies
08-12-92 Note: TAPE: 920414 COUNT: 1050
julies
08-12-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MAC ARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTjulies
08-12-92 Note: Deft is present
julies
08-12-92 Note: CUSTODY^ County Sheriff
julies
08-12-92 Note: Chrg: 76-5-203
Plea: Not Guilty
julies
08-12-92 Note: Chrg: 76-10-503
Finding: Dismissed
julies
08-12-92 Note: TO BE SET FOR 3-DAY JURY TRIAL IN 60-90 DAYS; REQUEST
FOR
julies
08-12-92 Note: APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR GRANTED WITH INITIAL CAP OF
52,000
julies
08-12-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II
julies
08-12-92 Note: FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON COUNT II
julies
08-12-92 Note: FILED: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATOR
julies
08-12-92 Note: FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT ON ARRAIGNMENT
julies

08-19-92 Note Notice of Setting
[ 3 day trial ]
julies
09-03-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO RELEASE EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM
09-04-92 Note: FILED: ORDER RELEASING EXHIBIT 4 7- FIREARM
taunah
09-08-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO REQUIRE BALLISTICS TESTING
taunah
09-09-92 Note: FILED: RECEIPT OF EXHIBIT 4 7- FIREARM (DEP PAM
HUMPHREYS)
taunah
09-09-92 Note: FILED: ORDER REQUIRING BALLISTICS TESTING
taunah
10-06-92 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE
taunah
10-06-92 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR INVESTIGATOR
taunah
10-06-92 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (10-7-92)
taunah
10-07-92 Note: Continuance
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
taunah
10-07-92 Note: TAPE: 920493 COUNT: 0272
taunah
10-07-92 Note: Deft Present
taunah
10-07-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTtaunah
10-07-92 Note: CUSTODY: County Sheriff
taunah
10-07-92 Note: COURT GRANTS DEF MOTION FOR CONT OF JURY TRIAL AND
MOTION
FOR
taunah
10-07-92 Note: S1000 ADDITIONAL FUNDS. MR LANGSTON CONCURS. JURY TRIAL
TO
taunah
10-07-92 Note: BE RESCHEDULED FOR LATE NOV OR EARLY DEC
taunah
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10-19-92 Note: FILED: REPORTER'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
(08-10-92)
gwynm
10-22-92 Note: Notice of Setting
[ 3 day trial ]
julies
10-22-92Note: (JURY TRIAL SET FOR 12/15 92, 12/17,92 & 12/18/92) julies
12-07-92 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L.
gwynm
12-07-92 Note: TAPE: 920594 COUNT: 1199
gwynm
12-07-92 Note: Deft Present
gwynm
12-07-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm
12-07-92 Note: FILED NOTICE OF HEARING
gwynm
12-07-92 Note: FILED STIPULATED MOTION FOR COURT REPORTER
12-07-92 Note: FILED ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER [JLS 12-09-92]
12-07-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
12-09-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
12-09-92 Note: FILED: SUBPOENA AND RETURN OF SERVICE (7)
12-09-92 Note:
GRANT AREND

gwyr
gwynm

12-09-92 Note:
CONNIE FRAUSTO
12-09-92 Note:
DAVID ICE
12-09-92 Note:
DEBBIE HERN
12-09-92 Note:
MELANIE LEE AREND
12-09-92 Note:
TRISH ICE
12-09-92 Note:
KATHY SCHEAR
12-09-92 Note: Heanng (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L.
gwynm
12-09-92 Note: TAPE: 920596 COUNT: 1576
gwynm
12-09-92 Note: Deft Present
gwynm
12-09-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm
12-09-92 Note: CUSTODY: County Sheriff
gwynm
12-14-92 Note- FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER
slw
12-14-92 Note: FILED: DEFENDANTS REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
juhes
12-15-92 Note: JURY TRIAL:
JAMES L SHUMATE
taunah
12-15-92 Note: ATP W BRENT LANGSTON
ATD J MACARTHUR WRIGHT
taunah
12-16-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
taunah
12-17-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
taunah
12-18-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
taunah
12-18-92 Note: JURY VERDICT: GUILTY AS CHARGED ON INFORMATION
taunah
12-18-92 Note: DEFENDANT WAIVED TIME FOR SENTENCING
taunah
12-18-92 Note: SENTENCE: 5 YEARS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
NO FINE IMPOSED.
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
1 YEAR CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON
ENHANCEMENT) +
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
5 YEARS CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON
ENHANCEMENT)
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
FOR A TOTAL OF 11 YEARS TO LIFE.
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
RESTITUTION ORDERED AMOUNT TO BE DOUBLED AFTER
DETERM
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
INATION BY COA
taunah
12-18-92 Note:
DEFENDANT COMMITED TO CUSTODY OF SHERIFF FOR
TRANSPOR
taunah
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12-18-92 Note:
TO UTAH STATE PRISON
taunah
12-18-92 Note: Chrg: 76-5-203 Find: Guilty - Jury
taunah
12-18-92 Note. FILED: SUPPLEMENTAL'INSTRUCTION
12-18-92 Note: FILED: MENU FOR JURORS (COURT EXHIBIT #3)
12-18-92 Note: FILED: COURT EXHIBIT -1
taunah

taunah
taunah

12-18-92 Note: FILED: COURT EXHIBIT =2
taunah
12-18-92 Note: FILED: JURY INSTTUCTIONS
taunah
12-18-92 Note: FILED: JURY VERDICT
taunah
12-18-92 Note: FILED: DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
taunah
12-18-92 Note: FILED: SUBPOENA'S AND RETURN OF SERVICE
12-18-92 Note:
JOSHUA MICHAELS
12-18-92 Note:
TROY WILKINSON
12-18-92 Note:
WILLIAM LEE DORNEY
12-18-92 Note:
LEIGHANN REBER
12-23-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
12-23-92 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L.
gwynm
12-23-92 Note: TAPE: 920588 COUNT: 0020
gwynm
12-23-92 Note: Deft Present
gwynm
12-23-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MAC ARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm
12-23-92 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
gwynm
01-06-93 Note: FILED: JUDGMENT, RESTITUTION JUDGMENT, SENTENCE &
COMMITMENT
01-06-93 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed
01-20-93 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL
gwynm
01-20-93 Note: FILED: REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT
gwynm
01-21-93 Note: FILED: ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT [JLS 01-21-93]
gwynm
01 -22-93 Note: FILED: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
gwynm
01 -22-93 Note:
* AMENDED NOTICE APPEAL FORWARDED TO UTAH SUPREME
COURT
gwynm
01-26-93 Note: FILED: SUPREME COURT THIS DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL CASE
#930034
gwynm
01-28-93 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF TRANSFER FROM SUPREME COURT TO UTAH
COURT
gwynm
01-28-93 Note:
OF APPEALS FOR DISPOSITION
gwynm
02-10-93 Note: FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY AND APPEARANCE OF
SUBSTITUTE
02-10-93 Note:
COUNSEL (MICHAEL MILLER)
03-08-93 Note: FILED: REPORTERS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS (FOUR VOLUMES)
jbh
03-08-93 Note: FILED: REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT (12-23-92)
jbh
03-11 -93 Note: FILE SENT TO SUPREME COURT
jbh
06-03-93 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT (SENT TO COURT OF
APPEALS)
06-16-93 Note: FILED: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASE # 930357-CA
gwynm
10-08-93 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
gwynm
05-03-94 Note: Notice of Setting
taunah
05-03-94 Note: *SET FOR HEARING PER JLS
taunah
05-09-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on May 25, 1994 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
slw
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05-19-94 Note: FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER [JLS 05-18-94]
gwynm
05-25-94 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L
vannaf
05-25-94 Note: TAPE: 940265 COUNT: 0001
vannaf
05-25-94 Note: ATD: Deft prose
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTvannaf
05-25-94 Note: Deft Present and pro se
vannaf
05-31-94 Note: FILED EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE
kathyh
06-01-94 Note: FILED ORDER OF CONTINUANCE(JLS 5/31 /94)
kathyh
06-06-94 Note: FILED TRANSPORTATION ORDER (JLS 6-3-94)
julies
06-06-94 Hearing Indigent scheduled on June 08, 1994 at 08:54 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: Hearing (INDIGENCY HEARING):
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: TAPE: 940284 COUNT: 0040
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: ATD: None Present
ATP: LUDLOW, ERIC gwynm
06-08-94 Note: Deft Present
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: THE ISSUE OF THE PRIOR PUBLIC DEFENDER IS MUTE. MR.
LUDLOW
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: THE WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY IS ATTEMPTING TO
RETAIN
COUNgwynm
06-08-94 Note: SEL IN IRON COUNTY TO ASSIST THE DEFENDANT.
gwynm
06-08-94 Note: THE HEARING IS CONTINUED TO JUNE 15, 1994.
gwynm
06-14-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on June 15, 1994 at 01:29 PM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: TAPE: 940293 COUNT: 2260
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm
06-15-94 Note: Deft Present
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: MR. FLOYD HOLM IS RETAINED BY WASHINGTON COUNTY TO
ASSIST
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS APPEAL AND HEARINGS. COUNSELS
REQUIRE
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE PROCEEDING. THE HEARING IS

RESCHEDL'Lgwynm
06-15-94 Note: ED FOR JULY 13, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. ON MOTON TO
SUPPLEMENT
gwynm
06-15-94 Note: THE RECORD.
gwynm
06-22-94 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (F
HOLM)slw
07-11-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on July 13, 1994 at 01:29 PM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
julies
07-13-94 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L
julies
07-13-94 Note: TAPE: 940319 COUNT: 0624
julies
07-13-94 Note: ATD: None Present
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTjulies
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07-13-94 Note: Deft not present
julies
07-13-94 Note: MR LANGSTON INFORMS THE COURT THAT STIPULATION HAS BEEN
julies
07-13-94 Note: REACHED BETWEEN COUNSEL AS TO MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD;
julies
07-13-94 Note: COURT INSTRUCTS MR LANGSTON TO SUBMIT WRITTEN
STIPULATION
WHICH
julies
07-13-94 Note: HAS BEEN SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT
julies
10-14-94 Note: FILED: ORDER SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD) (JLS 10/12/94)
mjm
03-06-95 Note: **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD TO
THE
taunah
03-06-95 Note: COURT OF APPEALS
taunah
03-09-95 Note: **FILE MAILED TO COURT OF APPEALS ON REQUEST (SUE)**
taunah
09-14-95 Note: FILED: COPY OF LETTER TO FLOYD W HOLM FROM UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
cms
09-14-95 Note:
RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE
cms
11-28-95 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT RE: DISMISSAL OF ATTORNEY
FLOYD
cms
11-28-95 Note:
HOLM
*PER JLS, FILE
cms
12-28-95 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPY OF FILE cms
01 -09-96 Note: *COPY OF DOCKET MAILED TO DEFENDANT
cms
01 -09-96 Note: *COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
cms
01-12-96 Note: FILED: LETTER TO JUDGE SHUMATE FROM DEFENDANT RE: NEW
COUNSEL
cms

01-12-96 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM DECISION [JLS 1-12-96]
cms
01-12-96 Note:
(COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON MOTION - COURT OF
.APPEALS)
cms
02-06-96 Note: FILED: ORDER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (MATTER IS
TEMPORARILY
cms
02-06-96 Note:
REMANDED TO FIFTH DISTRICT FOR EXPEDITED HEARING
RE:
cms
02-06-96 Note:
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S ALLEGED CONFLICT OF
INTEREST)
cms
02-06-96 Note: **COPIES OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE ORDER:
cms
02-06-96 Note: LETTER FROM RICHARD FRAUSTO TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
(2/2'96)
cms
02-06-96 Note: CROSS-MOTION FOR REMAND FOR HEARING ON COUNSEL
cms
02-06-96 Note: MOTION TO SUSPEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE
cms
02-06-96 Note: AFFIDAVIT OF FLOYD W HOLM
cms
02-07-96 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on February 21, 1996 at 11:00 AM
in Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
carolyns
02-07-96 Note: Notice of Setting
carolyns
02-08-96 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (2/21/96)
cms
02-15-96 Note: FILED: ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION [JLS 2-15-96]
cms
02-15-96 Note:
*FAXED TO FLOYD HOLM ON 2/16/96
cms
02-15-96 Note: RECEIVED: "FAXED" COVER LETTER AND ORDER OF
TRANSPORTATION
cms
02-21-96 Note: MINUTE ENTRY
gwynm
02-21-96 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES
L
gwynm
Printed: 01/04/02 14:43:52
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02-21-96 Note TAPE: 960072 COUNT: 11:11
gwynm
02-21-96 Note ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm
02-21-96 Note Deft Present
gwynm
02-21-96 Note CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
gwynm
02-21-96 Note DUE TO CONFLICT MR. FLOYD W HOLM IS RELEASED FROM THE
CASE &
gwynm
02-21 -96 Note: MR. THOMAS A BLAKELY IS APPOINTED TO REPESENT THE
DEFENDANT.
gwynm
02-22-96 Note: FILED: ORDER [JLS 2-22-96] (FLOYD HOLM RELEASED AS
COUNSEL AND
cms
02-22-96 Note:
THOMAS BLAKELY APPOINTED)
cms
02-23-96 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (FLOYD W HOLM)

cms

02-26-96 Note: FILED: CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (PAGE 5 SUPPLEMENTAL
cms
02-26-96 Note:
INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL AND COPIES OF ALL
DOCUMENTS
cms
02-26-96 Note:
LISTED)
cms
03-18-96 Note: Began tracking Appeal
Review on
06/30/96
cms
06-13-96 Note: Appeal
Review date changed to
12/31/96
cms
07-01-96 Note: FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

cms

07-01-96 Note: Ended tracking of Appeal
cms
08-14-96 Note: FILED: REMITTITUR AND COPY OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT
OF
cms
08-14-96 Note:
APPEALS
cms
01-14-97 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPIES
taunah
01-14-97 Note: PER JLS: SEND COPY OF JUDGMEMNT AND COPY OF DOCKET TO
DEFENDANT
taunah
04-17-97 Filed: Letterfromdefendant to Judge Shumate (per JLS file no
action)
merrianm
09-02-97 Filed: Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel,
Thomas A Blakely (per JLS just file - no further action)
mernanm
10-08-97 Filed: Letter from defendant regarding copy of order of
dismissal (per JLS file - no action)
merrianm
10-20-97 Filed: Petition for a Court Order Granding Re-Sentencing
merrian
08-17-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for EVIDENTIARY HEARING
evelynk
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: evelynk
Prosecutor: ERIN RILEY
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number:

990236 Tape Count: 11:04-12:04

HEARING
Printed: 01/04/02 14:43:56
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Following Habeas Corpus Petition (970501445). Court orders
defendant resentenced nun pro tunc to accord him rights to

appellate procedure. Appeal time to run when judgment, sentence,
commitment nun pro tunc is signed.
Ms Riley to prepare same with County Attorney.
12-14-99 Filed: Notice of Review Hearing
georgis
12-14-99 Notice •• NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 882689
georgis
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 12/22/1999
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Courtroom D
HALL OF JUSTICE
220 NORTH 200 EAST
ST GEORGE, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
12-14-99 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on December 22, 1999 at 01:30 PM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
georgis
12-22-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing
diannem
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
Clerk: diannem
Prosecutor: TARA DUGAN
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number: 990405 Tape Count: 1:50
HEARING
This matter is heard in conjunction with civil case number
970501445. Court orders Mr. Bowler to prepare a Remand Order in
the civil case so that resentencing can be set for this matter.
Mr. Bowler to have order prepared no later than 12/30/99. (1:53 en
12-29-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 888018
merrianm
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 01/26/2000
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom D
HALL OF JUSTICE
220 NORTH 200 EAST
ST GEORGE, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
Sentencing reset per order in case 970501445 - Prosecutor to
prepare Transportation Order
12-29-99 SENTENCING scheduled on January 26, 2000 at 10:00 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
memanm
01 -03-00 Filed: Notice of Sentencing
merrianm
01-07-00 Note: RECEIVED: Transportation Order
evelynk

01-10-00 Filed order: Transportation Order

evelynk

Judge jshumate
Printed: 01/04/02 14:44:04
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Signed January 10,2000
01 -26-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: wendyc
Prosecutor: BRIAN FILTER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number:

wendyc

000032 Tape Count: 11:09

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant's counsel ODEAN BOWLER has made a motion for
continuance of Sentencing.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
More time needed to look into a possible second writ.
HEARING
TAPE: 000032 COUNT: 11:09
On record
This matter is back on the calendar for sentencing, after having
been remanded back, by the Supreme Court, after filing an appeal.
There is possibly a second writ pending.
This matter is continued to February 2, 2000 at 10:00 a.m.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Washington County
Sheriff office.
COUNT: 11:13
Off record
SENTENCING.
Date: 02/02/2000
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom D
HALL OF JUSTICE
220 NORTH 200 EAST

ST GEORGE. LT 84770
Before Judge. JAMES L. SHUMATE
01-26-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 02. 2000 at 1000 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
wendyc
01 -26-00 SENTENCING Continued.
denices
02-02-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 09, 2000 at 10:00 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
denices
02-02-00 Minute Entry - Sentencing continued
denices
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: denices
Prosecutor- ERIC LUDLOW
Printed: 01 /04/02 14 44:13

Page 9

CASE NUMBER 921500702 State Felony

TARA DUGAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number:

00-0043 Tape Count: 11:14/11:16

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant's counsel ODEAN BOWLER has made a motion for
continuance of Sentencing.
The motion is granted.
Counsel submits explanations to the Court and requests continuance
to allow additional time for research on the matter before the
Court's calendar today. State does not object. Case is continued
for sentencing.
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 02/09/2000
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom D
HALL OF JUSTICE
220 NORTH 200 EAST
'ST GEORGE, UT 84770
Before Judge- JAMES L. SHUMATE
02-02-00 SENTENCING Continued.
evelynk
02-09-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 10. 2000 at 01:30 PM in
Araignment Courtroom.
evelynk

02-09-00 Minute Entry - Sentencing continued
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: evelynk
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number:

evelynk

000053 Tape Count: 10:56/10:58

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant's counsel Odean Bowler has made a motion for
continuance of Sentencing.
The motion is granted.
Counsel approach. Continue to 2-10-00 at 1:30 to allow Mr Bowler
time to meet with defendant.
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 02/10/2000
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Araignment Courtroom
Fifth District Court
Printed: 01/04/02 14:44:16
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220 North 200 East
St. George, UT
02-09-00 SENTENCING Continued.
02-10-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for RE-SENTENCING
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: evelynk
Prosecutor: PAUL CHRISTENSEN
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER
Video
Tape Number:

000054 Tape Count: 1:39/148

HEARING
Matter before the Court for resentencing as a result of Habeas

evelynk

Corpus petition. Mr Bowler updates Court on status of appeal.
Docket text incorrect regarding sentence. Court clarifies same.
County Attorney to prepare a judgment that corrects said language.
Defendant's materials ordered safeguarded and transported for
defendant. Mr Bowler to prepare order.
Defendant sentenced 5 - life and one year consecutive with an
additional indeterminant term up to 6 years on the firearms
enhancement. Credit given for time served nunc pro tunc.
County Attorney to prepare order and forward to Mr Bowler for
review before submitting to Court.
Defendant informed of right to appeal.
02-10-00 Note: RE-SENTENCING minutes modified.
evelynk
03-10-00 Filed: Letter from Defendant (per JLS, Call Odean Bowler to get
his order submitted)
wehdyc
03-14-00 Note: **Called Mr. Bowler's office and left message to submit
order.**
wendyc
03-29-00 Filed: Request for Copy of Tape (Tape *000054 Wash Co Atty) judymb
04-12-00 Note: Request for Transcript of Trial RECD. Request referred
to Paul McMullin for copying purposes.
carolyns
04-13-00 Note: Request for Copy of Preliminary Hearing Transcript RECD.
Request referred to Paul McMullin for copying purposes.
carolyns
04-18-00 Filed: Promiose to Pay Cost of Transcript
evelynk
04-18-00 Filed: Transcript Request/Billing Statement
evelynk
04-18-00 Note: Copies of Transcripts received from Paul McMullin and
forwarded to Mr. Bowler, requester.
carolyns
04-18-00 Trust Account created
Total Due:
1078.00
carolyns
04-24-00 Judgment #1 Entered
wendyc
Creditor: STATE OF UTAH
Debtor: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO
6,265.50 Total Judgment
6,265.50 Judgment Grand Total
04-24-00 Filed judgment: Judgment, Restitution Judgment, Sentence,
Printed: 01/04/02 14:44:20
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(Amended Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment
wendyc
Judge jshumate
Signed April 20, 2000
05-05-00 Note: RECEIVED: Judgment, Restitution Judgment
evelynk
05-08-00 Judgment #1 Modified
evelynk
Creditor: STATE OF UTAH
Debtor: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO

6,265.50 Total Judgment
6,265.50 Judgment Grand Total
05-08-00 Filed order: Judgent, Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second
Amended Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment
evelynk
Judge j shumate
Signed May 08, 2000
05-11-00 Reporter Fees
Payment Received:
1,078.00 lailm
Note: Mail Payment;
05-22-00 Note:
05-22-00 Note: Check #12198 payee changed to
from
susans
05-22-00 Reporter Fees Check # 12198 Trust Payout:
1,078.00 susans
06-05-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal
wendyc
06-06-00 Note: **Certified copy of notice of appeal sent to Appeals
Court**
wendyc
06-21-00 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court to Odean Bowler (case
#20005 20-SC)
evelynk
10-16-00 Filed: Order (matter transferred to Utah Court of Appeals) sharones
10-19-00 Filed: Copy of LetterfromUtah Court of Appeals, rexase is
now in that office with the case #20000520-CA assigned, dated
10/16/00 and addressed to Odean Bowler
denices
10-27-00 Note: *File Sent to Court of Appeals via UPS*
evelynk
12-12-00 Filed: OrderfromUtah Court of Appeals dated 12-8-00
sharones
12-13-00 Notice - NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 1058094
sharones
STATUS OF COUNSEL is scheduled.
Date: 01/17/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom D
HALL OF JUSTICE
220 NORTH 200 EAST
ST GEORGE, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
12-13-00 STATUS OF COUNSEL scheduled on January 17, 2001 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE.
sharones
12-13-00 Filed: Notice of Status of Counsel
sharones
01-17-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for STATUS OF COUNSEL
evelynk
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
PRESENT
Clerk: evelynk
Prosecutor: LUDLOW, ERIC A
Defendant
Video
Printed: 01/04/02 14:44:26
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Tape Number:

010018 Tape Count: 9:02/9:03

HEARING
Court authorizes telephone contact with Ms Whiteley.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints BRENDA S WHITELEY
to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: BRENDA S WHITELEY
Address: 150 North 200 East Suite 203 PO Box 160
City: St George UT 84770
Phone: 435-628-2884
01-17-01 Filed: Substitution of Counsel
sharones
01-26-01 Note: SENT: 2ND SUPPLEMENTAL INDEX TO COURT OF APPEALS
evelynk
Printed: 01/04/02 14:44:27
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